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1 Introduction 
This document is positioned within the framework of activities for the ‘European airport Movement 
Management by A-SMGCS (EMMA)’ Project. Sub-project SP6 deals with the Verification and 
Validation (V&V) activities to be carried out within the Project.  
The first chapter of this document contains a description of the sub-project context and the purpose of 
this document.  
 
1.1 Document Context 
1.1.1 EMMA SP6 Background 
In the near future, the demand for air transport in Europe is expected to increase considerably. Current 
airport capacity is expected to become one of the bottlenecks for further growth. This caused the 
European Union to support research on A-SMGCS in subsequent Framework programs. These 
projects resulted in a revised A-SMGCS concept, new systems, and new procedures. A common 
finding of these studies (such as ATHOS, DEFAMM and BETA) is that validation practices are often 
insufficiently standardised to cover the complexity of advanced technology implementation. At the 
same time, coherent and consistent validation is important for choosing the optimal concepts, systems 
and procedures.  
The EMMA Project proposal consists of six sub-projects, the last one being the V&V Sub-Project 
described in more detail in the present document. The EMMA Project was offered to the European 
Commission in two phases. The present specification deals with V&V in the first phase covering two 
years. The second phase will be carried out later and will concentrate on more advanced functions of 
A-SMGCS. 
SP6 provides a systematic step towards the V&V of A-SMCGS. It describes a framework for the 
V&V concepts, systems and procedures. In the first phase of the EMMA Project, the focus will be on: 
• Consolidation of the first two Eurocontrol A-SMGCS Levels for participating airports and 
corresponding airborne applications, on the basis of internationally agreed manuals and practices; 
and preparation of A-SMGCS recommended practices for V&V and certification, with an 
emphasis on Capacity, Workload, Cost-Benefit and Efficiency. “Level I/II” relates to the 
EUROCONTROL implementation levels. This concept definition has been taken over by EMMA 
with the initial concept documents where the V&V activities relate to.  
• Selected A-SMGCS V&V Themes (or their preparation for V&V in EMMA2): 
o Low Visibility Conditions and Head-up/Head-down V&V 
o Runway Incursion Monitoring and Conflict Alert System (RIMCAS) V&V 
o A-SMGCS integration and co-ordination with ACC, APP 
o Mature airborne applications like ADS-B downlink for tower surveillance 
o Integration and evolution aspects of A-SMGCS with respect to existing SMGCS 
The contents of SP6 in EMMA2 Project will be defined at a later stage. Candidate V&V subjects for 
the second phase are:  
• Planning and Routing, 
• Enhanced Conflict Monitoring, 
• Enhanced Onboard Services (AMM, Ground Traffic display, CPDLC) 
 
Validation in the EMMA framework refers to all activities during the development of A-SMGCS 
concepts, systems and procedures aiming at implementing the right concept, system or procedure. The 
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concept development itself is carried out in EMMA SP1 and thus it is not a part of the SP6 work. 
Developing and implementing the right concepts, procedures and systems (in terms of safety, 
efficiency, usability, etc.) are of utmost importance at a time when advances in ATM are urgently 
required.  
Before successful validation takes place, verification, i.e. testing against system specifications should 
take place. SP6 also covers the description of the Verification Phase. Only if verification results in an 
A-SMGCS performing at the required level, can successful validation of the concept be started. 
Therefore, the V&V effort also includes the definition of minimum required performance criteria for 
verification, to allow for successful validation. The actual execution of verification tasks may take 
place in other sub-projects of EMMA 1. 
In summary:  
Verification is testing against predefined technical specifications, i.e. technical functional testing. It 
answers the question “Did we build the system right?” 
Validation is testing against operational requirements (as defined by stakeholders and written down 
in the OSED [14] and ORD [13] documents of EMMA SP1), i.e. man-in-the-loop, ATM procedure 
testing, and case studies. It answers the question “Did we build the right system?” 
 
1.1.2 V&V Approach 
During the proposal phase of EMMA1, it was decided to use the ‘Master European Validation Plan 
(MAEVA)’ Project approach to validation as the basis for EMMA V&V. The MAEVA approach is 
well accepted throughout the European ATM community and has been described in abundant detail in 
the MAEVA Validation Guideline Handbook (VGH) [8]. Nevertheless, several adaptations of 
MAEVA were proposed in Europe, concentrating on the initial approach to validation activities and 
the related life cycle of the concept or technology to be validated. Eurocontrol summarised this 
proposal in their Operational Concept Validation Strategy Document (OCVSD) [9].   
In order to account for the generally accepted MAEVA approach, the Sub-Project Leader will liaise 
closely with both the MAEVA and Cooperative Approach to Air Traffic Services (CAATS) project 
teams. The European Commission instigated the CAATS project with the objective to coordinate 
safety, Human Factors and validation processes and methodologies across ATM projects in the Sixth 
Framework. CAATS will identify best practices from these areas and bring the implied knowledge to 
all projects of the Framework. The aim is to provide a coordinated approach to bring about the 
paradigm shift described in the ATM2000+ strategy [6]. 
The Sub-Project Leader will also liaise closely with EUROCONTROL in order to account for possible 
new developments in the area of validation in other projects. 
Since the main objectives of the EMMA Project are to assess the operational benefits of A-SMGCS 
and to promote harmonised implementation throughout Europe, it has been decided to perform 
operational benefits assessment at three different airport sites. It is expected that these common V&V 
activities will help to define common and acceptable standards for A-SMGCS, to pave the way for 
possible future certification of ground systems. 
 
1.1.3 Methodology 
MAEVA establishes a uniform framework for the validation of ATM concepts such as A-SMGCS. 
This methodology is helpful to provide guidelines along the entire validation process. This 
methodology allows asking the good questions related to validation and presents concrete examples of 
applications of the methodology. Its step-by-step approach helps the validation team to address the 
validation activity in an exhaustive way.  
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The MAEVA approach consists of five steps (and a number of sub-steps) as outlined below. It should 
be noted that MAEVA only considers validation. 
 
Step Sub-step Activity Outputs 
1.1 Understanding the ATM problem and operational concept 
Clearly defined scope, and operational 
concept  
1.2 Identification of stakeholders List of stakeholders 
1.3 Identification of validation aims List of aims 
1.4 Identification of validation objectives List of objectives 
1.5 Establishing the validation platform requirements List of requirements 
1.6 Identification of metrics and indicators List of suitable metrics and indicators  
1.7 Identification of hypotheses List of hypotheses 
1.8 Definition of high-level experimental design Experimental design 
1. Identification of 
Validation Aims, 
Objectives and 
Hypotheses 
1.9 Pre-trial definition of operational and statistical significance Predefined significance levels 
2.1 Selection of techniques, facility and detailed experimental design 
Experimental plan 
Configured V&V facilities 
2.2 Preparation of outline plan  
Measurements definition 
Validation timeline 
2.3 Scenario specification Scripted scenarios 
2.4 Production of the overall site specific V&V management plan  
2. Validation Design: 
Planning and 
Preparing the 
Validation Exercise 
2.5 Preparation of the exercise runs  
3. Conduct of 
Validation Exercises N/A 
Conduct of validation exercises at 
different test sites. Predefined validation data 
4.1 Carrying out of predefined analysis Mathematical results with significance indication  
4. Analysis of Results 
4.2 Interpretation of results Results translated from figures in easily understood language 
5.1 Formulate conclusions and recommendations 
Conclusions and recommendations 
about the concept 
5.2 Write report Final validation report 
5. Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
5.3 Disseminate results Presentations, demonstrations, website 
Table 1-1: Validation Approach according to MAEVA Guidelines 
 
1.1.4 EMMA WP6.3 Context 
Work Package 6.3 of EMMA Phase 1 focuses on V&V activities for the A-SMGCS test-bed at 
Prague-Ruzynĕ Airport, established under Sub-Project SP3 of EMMA.  
These V&V activities in EMMA will use two validation platforms: 
• Real-time simulations, to simulate safety-critical events, validate A-SMGCS procedures, and 
measure operational improvements in a realistic environment 
• Operational trials, to validate requirements and procedures in the real operational environment and 
show some potential operational improvements. 
The series of tests starts with real-time simulations at DLR-Braunschweig’s Tower Simulator, 
concentrating on tuning the parameters of the Runway Incursion Monitoring and Conflict Alerting 
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System (RIMCAS) and validating the whole system at different visibility conditions, with and without 
A-SMGCS functionality by measuring operational improvements (Safety and Efficiency). These real-
time simulations are a preparatory step for the operational trials at Prague-Ruzynĕ Airport, which are 
aimed at validating the A-SMGCS under real operational conditions. 
It should be borne in mind that even though simulation re-creates a realistic environment, and permits 
the safe testing of safety-critical events and repetitive testing of rare events, at the end operational 
trials must be performed to prove the operational feasibility of new standards and procedures. 
Following Gantt chart is aimed to perform V&V activities for Prague: 
 
Figure 1-1: Gantt chart for Prague V&V activities 
V&V activities are performed by two iterative test phases. Both are composed of technical on-site 
tests, RT-Simulations, and operational on-site trials. The phase in between is used to further improve 
and tune the A-SMGCS by the feedback gained from test phase one. 
1.2 Document Purpose 
This document is the deliverable D6.1.2, the V&V Test Plan for the A-SMGCS at Prague-Ruzynĕ 
Airport. It is based on D6.1.1, V&V Strategy Document (Master Plan) [19].  
Its purpose is to: 
1. Identify the V&V aims, objectives and hypotheses for the tests 
2. Plan and prepare the validation exercises 
3. Provide a high-level description of how the V&V activities will be conducted. 
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1.3 Document Scope 
Generally, the document follows the MAEVA guidelines. Apart from the aims and objectives, it 
describes the experimental factors that determine the experiment design, the necessary metrics and 
measurements, the hypotheses that can be accepted or rejected based on the measurements made, and 
the complete test environment. Furthermore, the scenario specifications are given and requirements for 
participants and training of participants are determined. Finally, the conduct of the experiments will be 
described and the envisioned analysis methods will be outlined. 
The document is divided into 14 chapters. 
Chapter 1  is this introduction. It describes the background, purpose and scope of the document, the 
document structure and context, and the methodology used. 
Chapter 2  recalls the general V&V aims, described in D6.1.1, and adapts them to the Prague-Ruzynĕ 
test site, in accordance with activity 1.3 of the MAEVA methodology.  
Chapter 3  recalls the general V&V objectives, described in D6.1.1, and adapts them to the Prague-
Ruzynĕ test site, in accordance with activity 1.4 of the MAEVA methodology. 
Chapter 4  describes the experimental factors that are tested in the validation exercise, in accordance 
with activity 1.5 of the MAEVA methodology. 
Chapter 5  provides the definition of the metrics and indicators, in accordance with activity 1.6 of the 
MAEVA methodology.  
Chapter 6  derives validation hypotheses from the validation high-level objectives, in accordance 
with activity 1.7 of the MAEVA methodology. 
Chapter 7  describes the validation platform and the environment in which the validation activity is 
conducted, in accordance with activity 2.1 of the MAEVA methodology. 
Chapter 8  specifies the validation scenario, in accordance with activity 2.3 of the MAEVA 
methodology.  
Chapter 9  contains a description of participants and their roles in the experiments in the validation 
study. 
Chapter 10  identifies the training requirements for all validation participants, primarily the 
controllers, pilots, and vehicle drivers, who need to be trained on the A-SMGCS related 
tools and procedures 
Chapter 11  contains information about how the validation exercises will be conducted, in accordance 
with activity 3 of the MAEVA methodology.  
Chapter 12  describes the data analysis methods, in accordance with activity 4.1 of the MAEVA 
methodology.  
Chapter 13  is an annex containing the questionnaires and test sheets to be used for the validation 
experiments. 
Chapter 14  is an annex containing lists of references, figures, tables, acronyms and abbreviations used 
in the document. 
 
1.4 Explanation of terms 
This section provides the explanation of terms required for a correct understanding of the present 
document. Most of the following explanations are drawn from the ICAO A-SMGCS Manual [3] or the 
EUROCAE MASPS for A-SMGCS [2], in which case it is indicated in the definition. ICAO 
definitions are used as a first option. In general, other definitions are only used where there is no 
ICAO definition. 
 
Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS) 
Systems providing routing, guidance, surveillance and control to aircraft and affected vehicles in order 
to maintain movement rates under all local weather conditions within the Aerodrome Visibility 
Operational Level (AVOL) whilst maintaining the required level of safety 
 
Aerodrome 
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A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations, and equipment) intended to be 
used either wholly or in part for arrival, departure and surface movement of aircraft 
 
Aerodrome Visibility Operational Level (AVOL) 
The minimum visibility at or above which the declared movement rate can be sustained 
 
Alert 
An indication of an existing or pending situation during aerodrome operations, or an indication of 
abnormal A-SMGCS operation, that requires attention/action 
 
Alert Situation 
Any situation relating to aerodrome operations which has been defined as requiring particular attention 
or action 
 
Apron 
A defined area on a land aerodrome, intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes of loading or 
unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance 
 
A-SMGCS Capacity 
The maximum number of simultaneous movements of aircraft and vehicles that the system can safely 
support within an acceptable delay commensurate with the runway and taxiway capacity at a particular 
aerodrome 
 
Conflict 
A situation when there is a possibility of a collision between aircraft and/or vehicles 
 
Control 
Application of measures to prevent collisions, runway incursions and to ensure safe, expeditious and 
efficient movement 
 
False Alert 
With Prague V&V test activities a false alert is caused by false surveillance information (see also 
“unwanted” or “nuisance” alerts) 
 
Incursion 
The unauthorised entry by an aircraft, vehicle or obstacle into the defined protected areas surrounding 
an active runway, taxiway or apron 
 
Manoeuvring Area 
That part of an Aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, excluding aprons 
 
Movement Area 
That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, consisting of the 
Manoeuvring Area and Apron(s) 
 
Normal Visibility 
Visibility conditions sufficient for personnel of control units to exercise control over all traffic on the 
basis of visual Surveillance (correspond to visibility condition 1 defined by ICAO) 
 
Obstacle 
All fixed (whether temporary or permanent) and mobile obstacles, or parts thereof, that are located on 
an area intended for the surface movement of mobiles or that extend above a defined surface intended 
to protect aircraft in flight 
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Reduced Visibility  
Visibility conditions insufficient for personnel of control units to exercise control over all traffic on 
the basis of visual Surveillance (correspond to visibility conditions 2, 3, and 4 defined by ICAO) 
 
Restricted Area 
Aerodrome area where the presence of an aircraft or a vehicle is permanently or temporarily forbidden 
 
Runway Incursion  (EUROCONTROL Runway Incursion Task Force definition) 
The unintended presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the runway or runway strip 
 
Surveillance 
A function of the system which provides identification and accurate positional information on aircraft, 
vehicles and obstacles within the required area 
 
Unwanted (Nuisance) Alert 
An alert is raised although there is no conflict situation that would need the controllers special 
attention. 
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2 Verification and Validation Aims 
The purpose of this section is to clarify what is to be achieved from the EMMA V&V exercises in 
WP6.3. It contains the general aims in accordance with D6.1.1 “V&V Master Plan” and MAEVA.  
The basic aim of the EMMA Project is the V&V of A-SMGCS Level II functionality as described in 
the ICAO Manual and further refined in the ORD. EMMA Level II technical and operational 
functionality is identical to its definition outlined in the official documents of EUROCONTROL A-
SMGCS project. EMMA WP6.3 aims to validate the A-SMGCS Level II concept at Prague-Ruzynĕ 
airport. 
Four stages of V&V activities have been considered. These are illustrated in the figure below. 
 
Operational Improvements
Operational Feasibility
Technical 
Tests
Operational Benefits
Verification
Validation
 
Table 2-1  Stages of V&V Activities 
 
The Technical Tests Stage refers to the tests that should be conducted in order to assess the technical 
performance of A-SMGCS equipment. It answers the question: “What are the performances of the 
equipment?” 
The Operational Feasibility Stage refers to the definition of the operational use of equipment and 
procedures, in accordance with the performances assessed in the previous stage. It answers the 
question: “Given the performances of the equipment, is it usable and acceptable?” 
The Operational Improvements Stage refers to the evaluation of the operational improvements, in 
terms of Safety, Capacity, Efficiency and Human Factors, using the equipment and the procedures 
defined in the previous stage. It answers the question: “Given the accepted A-SMGCS equipment and 
procedures, how is ATM improved?” 
The Operational Benefits Stage refers to the translation of the operational improvements assessed 
during the previous stage into terms of economical benefits. It answers the question: “What are the 
economic benefits for the purchasers and users of A-SMGCS products?” 
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The ICAO Manual on A-SMGCS has already partially addressed some of these issues: 
• Performance requirements are defined in Chapter 4, 
• Operational requirements are defined in Chapter 3, 
• Methodologies for capacity and safety assessment are proposed in Chapter 5, 
• A methodology for a cost/benefit analysis is proposed in section 5.3. 
 
The ICAO Manual provides recommendations and guidelines only, and does not address specific tools 
and procedures. Therefore, one of the goals of the EMMA Project is to go one step further into the 
definition of requirements and recommendations for A-SMGCS users. V&V activities in EMMA 
should help end-users to: 
• Decide which A-SMGCS equipment is adapted to their needs, in terms of expected operational 
improvements 
• Define procedures to use the full potential of each level of A-SMGCS implementation in different 
visibility and traffic conditions 
• Assess the performance of A-SMGCS and check that the defined procedures can be safely applied. 
 
To summarise, the V&V aims for Prague-Ruzynĕ airport are as follows: 
Verification Aims: To demonstrate that the A-SMGCS (Surveillance and Control functions), 
provided to the controllers, are implemented in accordance with the technical specifications listed in 
D3.1.1, Ground System Requirements for Prague-Ruzynĕ Airport [17] and the D1.4.2a, Technical 
Requirements Document Part a – Ground [15]. The D142a Technical Requirements have been 
deduced from the operational requirements listed in D135 ORD [13]. 
 
Validation Aims: 
Overall aim is to assess the operational feasibility and operational improvements of the Prague-
Ruzynĕ A-SMGCS in achieving its intended operational goals as defined in the D131 OSED 
document [14] and the D135 ORD document [13]. 
In general, it can be expected that the validation exercises will demonstrate the Operational Feasibility 
of the ATM operational concept and that the concept provides a solution to the specific ATM problem 
and leads to Operational Improvements when comparing it to current SMGCS, both for airports and 
for the airborne side, and for different airport operating conditions. 
 
RT-Simulations will focus on the operational feasibility of the monitoring and alert function. RT-
Simulation platform serve as a perfect V&V platform to evoke safety critical events and to tune the 
system alerts to the needs of the ATCOs. In addition to this main goal operational improvements in 
terms of safety, efficiency, and capacity gains shall be proved. Also for this purpose the RTS is a well-
suitable means. 
On-site, V&V activities will concentrate on the measurement of the technical performance and 
showing the operational feasibility of the whole system. Measuring “operational improvements” in the 
field are very difficult or even impossible. Frequently users and the system are not certified to use it 
fully operational. Furthermore, a valid baseline with ceteris paribus condition compared to the 
experimental condition (with A-SMGCS) does not exist at all. Weather, traffic mix, traffic amount, 
runway in use, ATCOs, etc. change permanently and improvement effects of the A-SMGCS are 
shadowed then. However, in the field it has to be shown that the overall system meets the technical 
performance and operational requirements. When this can be proven, operational improvements, 
which are measured in the RTS, can be transferred to the real environment.  
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3 Verification and Validation Objectives 
3.1 General 
The V&V activities for Prague-Ruzynĕ airport base on the EMMA Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD) and the Technical Requirements Documents (TRD), which have been derived from 
the ICAO Manual on A-SMGCS. These documents describe the performance and operational 
requirements that should be taken into account when assessing the technical and operational 
performance of an A-SMGCS implementation.  
As stated previously, the ICAO Manual does not define procedures and levels of implementation. The 
procedures that will be used to test the operational feasibility of A-SMGCS at Prague-Ruzynĕ airport 
are the ones defined in the ORD, adapted to Prague-Ruzynĕ airport in doc D161 Test Site Operations 
([16] not public yet). 
 
3.2 Technical Tests 
The objective of these activities is to assess the performance of A-SMGCS at Prague-Ruzynĕ airport 
in relation to the EMMA technical requirements (EMMA TRDa, [15]). Performance Requirements are 
defined in Chapter 4 of the ICAO Manual. These requirements refer to the EMMA ORD and TRD 
documents, and to D3.1.1, Ground System Requirements for Prague-Ruzynĕ Airport. 
The most important technical requirements will be assessed by 18 verification indicators. Their 
relation to the TRD, ORD, ICAO, and EUROCAE technical requirements can be seen in chapter 5.1 
“Technical Tests”. The full TRD list of technical requirements including the related verification results 
will be part of the document D631 “Test Results PRAGUE”. 
The verification tests also aim at assessing the long-term quality of the surveillance and conflict 
detection performance. These measurements will be performed by the recording and analysis tool 
MOGADOR (see D1.1.2 “CDG A-SMGCS data analysis” for a description of MOGADOR tool). 
3.3 Operational Feasibility 
With the technical verification tests (see above) EMMA ORD operational requirements have been 
transformed into technical requirements in order to assess them objectively by technical tests. 
These operational feasibility tests aim at assessing the user’s acceptance of the EMMA ORD [13] 
operational procedures and requirements.  
It is expected, at the end of this stage, that the operational significance of the system is confirmed, for 
each set of visibility conditions, using defined procedures derived EMMA Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD). This will support the promotion of adapted procedures for the use of A-SMGCS 
EUROCONTROL levels I&II. 
 
High-level 
Objective 1 
EMMA A-SMGCS shows the operational feasibility of the operational procedures and 
requirements expressed in the initial EMMA ORD [13] for each set of conditions. 
 
3.4 Operational Improvement 
During the previous stage, full sets of performance and operational requirements and procedures for 
each operation condition have been proven for their operational feasibility. To be fully validated the 
system must show that new procedures contribute to an operational improvement. There are four areas 
of interest to measure these operational improvements.  
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The following table describes the high level objectives of this validation stage in the four areas of 
interest, referring to the corresponding sections in the ICAO manual on A-SMGCS [3]. 
 
High-level 
Objective 1 
With use of EMMA A-SMGCS, the level of Capacity of Prague airport will be 
maintained or even increased, especially under adverse weather conditions and in 
congested traffic situations. 
High-level 
Objective 2 
With use of EMMA A-SMGCS, the level of Safety of Prague airport will be 
maintained or even increased, especially under adverse weather conditions and in 
congested traffic situations. 
High-level 
Objective 3 
With use of EMMA A-SMGCS, the Efficiency of traffic movements will be increased, 
especially under adverse weather conditions and in congested traffic situations. 
High-level 
Objective 4 
With use of EMMA A-SMGCS, the Human Factors situation will be improved, 
especially under adverse weather conditions and in congested traffic situations. 
 
 
Low-Level Validation Objectives 
Since it is not possible to assess the above-stated high-level objectives directly, it is required to 
decompose the objectives into measurable indicators. Thus, for each category of high-level objective, 
it is necessary to identify indicators that can be measured either objectively or subjectively. Low-level 
objectives provide the decomposition of a high-level objective into a set of indicators that can be 
measured using a known technique. 
The indicators used in order to assess the operational improvement may differ for the various levels of 
A-SMGCS implementation. Furthermore, they may also differ for the various validation platforms 
(RT-Simulator vs. on-site trials). A nearly complete list of types of indicators used for the various high 
level objectives is described in the EMMA SP6 deliverables D6.2.1 [24] and D6.2.2 [25]. Depending 
on the validation platform and related constraints, only a subset of them will be addressed with 
EMMA V&V activities for Prague. The metrics and indicators are described in more detail in Chapter 
5.2. 
3.5 Operational Benefit 
The operational benefits are derived from the operational improvements assessed during the previous 
stage. Each observed operational improvement can be translated in terms of economical benefits, for 
each A-SMGCS end-user : airlines, ATC services and airport. 
 
These operational benefits can be compared to the costs of A-SMGCS implementation. Section 5.3 of 
the ICAO manual on A-SMGCS [3] describes a methodology for a cost/benefit analysis. However, no 
cost/benefit analysis has been planned in EMMA project for Prague test site. Nevertheless, an 
operational improvement in terms of “lower taxi times” or “less average delays” can easily be 
transformed into monetary benefits by the respective stakeholders. 
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The following figure presents the interrelation of operational benefit, improvements, high level and 
low level validation objectives, and costs. 
 
 
Table 3-1: Interrelation of Validation Objectives 
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4 Experimental Factors  
This Chapter describes all the experimental factors that will be tested during the validation exercises. 
4.1 The Experimental System (A-SMGCS) 
4.1.1 Experimental System Components 
The V&V exercises will use the A-SMGCS test-bed components at Prague-Ruzynĕ airport, 
established under SP3 of the EMMA Project, and the Real-time Tower Simulator at DLR-
Braunschweig. These Validation Platforms are described in Chapter 7 of this document. 
In EMMA, EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS Levels I and II will be examined. 
• At A-SMGCS Level I, additional surveillance information from the data fusion of cooperative 
and non-cooperative surveillance sensors should provide a seamless coverage of the entire 
Movement Area. Controllers are provided with a labelled Traffic Situation Display. 
• A-SMGCS Level II aims at complementing the A-SMGCS Level I Surveillance Service with a 
Control Service, the objective of which is to detect potentially dangerous conflicts in order to 
improve safety of runways and restricted areas. Controllers are provided with an automated system 
function (RIMCAS) for detecting and alerting them of potential conflicts. 
 
4.1.2 Experimental System Procedures 
The procedures applicable for the validation exercises are:  
• Current standard procedures as described in [16]. 
• Additional A-SMGCS Level I procedures as described in the ORD [13] 
• A-SMGCS Level II procedures as briefly addressed in the ORD [13] and defined in more detail 
below. 
 
4.1.2.1 Procedures for A-SMGCS Level I 
The A-SMGCS Level I procedures incorporate procedures for: 
• Identification of aircraft for use with an A-SMGCS Level I Surveillance System. 
• Using an A-SMGCS Level I Surveillance System as an approved surveillance means. 
• Transponder Operating Procedures for the flight crew 
 
4.1.2.2 Procedures for A-SMGCS Level II 
According to the ORD, A-SMGCS Level II gives the controller two types of alerts, named ‘Stage 1 
(Information)’ and ‘Stage 2 (Alarm)’. 
• Stage 1: When receiving an Stage 1 Alert a potentially dangerous situation may occur. The 
controller will use his skill and background to decide if, with remaining possible actions, the 
situation can be saved without using a too restrictive procedure (e.g. go-around). If successful, 
there will be no Stage 2 Alert. If not successful, a Stage 2 Alert will be activated and presented on 
the Traffic Situation Display. 
• Stage 2: When a Stage 2 Alert is received, a critical situation is developing and immediate action 
should be taken. The controller will use his skill and background to take appropriate action to try 
to save the situation (although the scope for any action may be limited). 
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4.2 The Baseline System  
4.2.1 Baseline System Components  
The Baseline System builds on the SMGCS at Prague-Ruzynĕ airport prior to the introduction of A-
SMGCS components. 
The technology used in the Baseline System validation exercises is: 
• Surface movement surveillance system without identification (SMR without labels) 
• Approach radar surveillance system including identification (ASR with labels) 
• Controller working positions with separate screens and HMI input devices for 
o Approach traffic situation display 
o Surface movement radar display 
These are described in more detail in Chapter 7 of this document. 
 
4.2.2 Baseline System Procedures 
The procedures applicable for the baseline validation exercises are:  
• Current standard procedures as described in [16]. 
• Procedural control during reduced visibility conditions. 
 
4.3 Influencing Factors  
The ICAO Manual mentions three factors that can influence an airport’s requirements for A-SMGCS. 
These are: 
• Visibility conditions 
• Traffic density 
• Aerodrome layout. 
 
4.3.1 Visibility Conditions 
The ICAO Manual proposes the following breakdown: 
• Visibility Condition 1: Visibility sufficient for the pilot to taxi and to avoid collision with other 
traffic on taxiways and at intersections by visual reference, and for personnel of control units to 
exercise control over all traffic on the basis of visual surveillance. 
• Visibility Condition 2: Visibility sufficient for the pilot to taxi and to avoid collision with other 
traffic on taxiways and at intersections by visual reference, but insufficient for personnel of 
control units to exercise control over all traffic on the basis of visual surveillance. 
• Visibility Condition 3: Visibility sufficient for the pilot to taxi but insufficient for the pilot to 
avoid collision with other traffic on taxiways and at intersections by visual reference, and 
insufficient for personnel of control units to exercise control over all traffic on the basis of visual 
surveillance. For taxiing this is normally taken as visibilities equivalent to a Runway Visual Range 
(RVR) of less than 400 m but more than 75 m; 
• Visibility Condition 4: Visibility insufficient for the pilot to taxi by visual guidance only. This is 
normally taken as a RVR of 75 m or less. 
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NOTE: The above visibility conditions apply for both day and night operations. 
Prague-Ruzynĕ airport is equipped for operations in Visibility Conditions 1, 2 and 3. 
 
4.3.2 Traffic Density 
Traffic density is measured from the mean busy hour independent of visibility conditions. 
Traffic density is divided into three categories: 
• Light (L): No more than 15 movements per runway or typically less than 20 total aerodrome 
movements per hour 
• Medium (M): 16 to 25 movements per runway or typically between 20 to 35 total aerodrome 
movements per hour 
• Heavy (H): 26 or more movements per runway or typically more than 35 total aerodrome 
movements per hour. 
Prague-Ruzynĕ has heavy traffic density during peak periods. 
 
4.3.3 Aerodrome Layout 
For aerodrome layout, the ICAO Manual proposes the following three levels: 
• Basic (B): An aerodrome with one runway with one taxiway to one apron area 
• Simple (S): An aerodrome with one runway, having more than one taxiway to one or more apron 
areas 
• Complex (C): An aerodrome with more than one runway, having many taxiways to one or more 
apron areas. 
 
Prague-Ruzynĕ is a Complex airport, since it has two crossing runways, many taxiways and multiple 
apron areas. 
 
4.3.4 Independent Variables 
The three factors, or independent variables (IV), are defined as follows: 
• IVSYS the System version (Baseline vs. A-SMGCS Level II)  
• IVROLE the Controller role (TPC, TEC, GEC) will be varied between the subjects.  
• IVVIS the Visibility Condition, varied by three levels (VIS1, VIS2, VIS3). 
 
The independent variables are treatment factors that are operated by the experimenter and that are 
supposed to cause expected effects. They are described and argued in the table below. 
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Independent 
Variables (IV) 
Description Levels 
IVSYS System Version =  
Technical System varied by 
different functions and their 
provided services 
This variable has two different technical systems:  
• SMGCS  
• A-SMGCS Level II 
IVROLE Controller Role = Rotation of 
the controllers at the working 
position  
Three control positions are evaluated: 
• GEC – Ground Executive Controller 
• TEC – Tower Executive Controller 
• TPC – Tower Planning Controller 
Each controller rotates through all control positions, i.e. 
each IVSYS and IVVIS combination will be performed by 
GEC, TEC, and TPC. 
IVVIS Visibility Condition =  
Comparison of different 
visibility levels to controller 
This variable has three levels: 
• VIS 1: 5km (good visibility) 
• VIS 2: 2km (impaired visibility - controller cannot 
see all traffic) 
• VIS 3: RVR < 600m = LVP, applies to CAT II/III 
[Pilot reports when vacating RWY, longer 
separation between landing traffic and departure 
and arrival, only one aircraft at a time on each 
segment of a TWY (longitudinal spacing)]. 
Table 4-1: Independent Variables 
 
4.4 Experimental Design 
The experimental design is based on the use of relative experiments. In relative experiments, the same 
scenarios are used for the Baseline System and the A-SMGCS set-up. In this way, results from the 
Baseline system can be directly compared with the A-SMGCS. However, for low visibility conditions 
combined with a medium to heavy traffic volume, this will not be possible. Such a level of throughput 
is not feasible with the Baseline System. Therefore, the experimental design will consider appropriate 
traffic volumes in these special cases. 
Quantitative analysis will be possible for the relative experiments, but qualitative analysis will also be 
an important part of the experiments due to the non-nominal nature of runway incursions. 
 
In conclusion, the following matrix shows the experiment set-up in terms of experimental factors: 
 
 SYS 1 SMGCS (Baseline) 
SYS 2 
A-SMGCS Level II 
VIS 1 X X 
VIS 2 X X 
VIS 3 X X 
Table 4-2: Combination of Experimental Factors 
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5 Metrics and Measurements 
The metrics and indicators used for the V&V exercises for the Prague-Ruzynĕ test site are divided into 
two groups.  
• Technical Verification Indicators:  derived from those described in EMMA deliverable D3.1.1, 
Ground System Requirements for Prague-Ruzynĕ Airport. 
• Operational Validation Indicators: derived from those described in EMMA deliverable D6.2.2, 
Indicators and Metrics for A-SMGCS. 
The types of measurements that will be performed for the Prague-Ruzynĕ test site are described in the 
scenario descriptions in Chapter 8 of the present document. 
 
5.1 Technical Verification Tests 
The following table summarises the indicators and measurement instruments associated with the 
verification of the technical performance requirements. 
 
ID Indicator Acronym Requirement Reference Measurement 
Instruments 
VE-1 Coverage 
Volume 
CV Approaches 
Manoeuvring Area 
Apron taxi lines 
TRD: Tech_Surv_01,2 
ORD: Op_Serv-07 
ICAO: 4.1.1.4 
MASPS: 3.1.3  
Recording 
Observations 
MOGADOR 
VE-2 Probability of 
Detection 
PD ≥ 99.9% TRD: Tech_Surv_35 
ORD: Op_ Perf-01 
ICAO: None 
MASPS: 3.2.3 
Recording 
Observations 
MOGADOR 
Matrix of Detection 
VE-3 Probability of 
False Detection 
PFD < 10E-3 per 
Reported Target 
TRD: Tech_Surv_36 
ORD: Op_ Perf-02 
ICAO: None 
MASPS: 3.2.3 
Recording 
Observations 
MOGADOR 
Matrix of Detection 
VE-4 Reference Point RP Not defined TRD: Tech_ Gen_45 
ORD: None 
ICAO: 3.5.7 
MASPS: 3.2.1.2  
Recording 
Observations 
 
VE-5 Reported 
Position 
Accuracy 
RPA ≤ 7.5 m  
at a confidence 
level of 95% 
TRD: Tech_Surv_26 
ORD: Op_Perf-05 
ICAO: 4.2.2 
MASPS: 3.2.3  
Recording 
Observations 
VE-6 Reported 
Position 
Resolution 
RPR ≤ 1 m  TRD: Tech_Surv_27 
ORD: Op_Perf-06 
ICAO: None 
MASPS: 3.2.3  
Recording 
Observations 
VE-7 Reported 
Position 
Discrimination 
RPD Not defined TRD: None 
ORD: None 
ICAO: None 
MASPS: None 
Recording 
Observations 
VE-8 Reported 
Velocity 
Accuracy 
RVA Speed:  ≤ 5 m/s 
Direction: ≤ 10° 
at a confidence 
level of 95% 
TRD: Tech_Surv_28,29 
ORD: Op_ Perf-17 
ICAO: 4.1.8, 4.1.9 
MASPS: 3.2.3  
Recording 
Observations 
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ID Indicator Acronym Requirement Reference Measurement 
Instruments 
VE-9 Probability of 
Identification 
PID ≥ 99.9% for 
identifiable Targets 
TRD: Tech_Surv_37 
ORD: Op_ Perf-03 
ICAO: None 
MASPS: 3.2.3 
Recording 
Observations 
MOGADOR 
Matrix of 
Identification 
VE-10 Probability of 
False 
Identification 
PFID < 10E-3 per 
Reported Target 
TRD: Tech_Surv_38 
ORD: Op_ Perf-04 
ICAO: None 
MASPS: 3.2.3 
Recording 
Observations 
MOGADOR 
Matrix of 
Identification 
VE-11 Target Report 
Update Rate 
TRUR ≤ 1 s  
 
TRD: Tech_Surv_34 
ORD: Op_ Perf-08 
ICAO: 4.2.6 
MASPS: 3.2.3  
Recording 
Observations 
VE-12 Probability of 
Detection of an 
Alert Situation 
PDAS ≥ 99.9% TRD: Tech_Cont_11 
ORD: None 
ICAO: 4.5.1 
MASPS: 3.3.3  
Recording 
Observations 
VE-13 Probability of 
False Alert 
PFA < 10E-3 per Alert TRD: Tech_ Cont_12 
ORD: Op_ Perf-20 
ICAO: 4.5.1 
MASPS: 3.3.3  
Recording 
Observations 
VE-14 Alert Response 
Time 
ART ≤ 0.5 s  
 
TRD: Tech_ Cont_13 
ORD: None 
ICAO: 4.5.2 
MASPS: 3.3.3  
Observations 
VE-16 Probability of 
Continuous 
Track 
PCT Not specified TRD: None 
ORD: None 
ICAO: None 
MASPS: None  
Recording 
MOGADOR 
VE-17 Matrix of 
Detection 
MOD Not specified TRD: None 
ORD: None 
ICAO: None 
MASPS: None  
Recording 
MOGADOR 
VE-18 Matrix of 
Identification 
MOI Not specified TRD: None 
ORD: None 
ICAO: None 
MASPS: None  
Recording 
MOGADOR 
Table 5-1: Technical Verification Indicators 
NOTE: Measuring instruments are described in Chapter 8. 
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5.2 Operational Feasibility  
To assess whether a system is operationally feasible, the user’s opinion plays a central role here. If the 
user (here: controller) expresses his/her acceptance to a service, a new procedure or a single system 
element and underlines their usability, it can be assumed that the operational feasibility is very high 
and evidentially proofed. 
 
Following questions/statements shall be given to the controllers. The questions/statements refer to five 
main subjects: general, surveillance, control, HMI, and procedures. The Id refers to the item number 
within the questionnaire. 
5.2.1 General 
Id. Questionnaire Item 
78 I used the A-SMGCS frequently.  
80 The A-SMGCS is highly relevant for my work. 
82 I feel very confident using the A-SMGCS. 
85 Under visibility 1 / good visibility conditions A-SMGCS provides no additional information.  
86 It is helpful to use A-SMGCS when visual reference is impaired 
87 I find the A-SMGCS unnecessarily complex.  
95 The A-SMGCS display gives me information which I missed before. 
117 I experienced the level of safety by using the A-SMGCS as very high. 
135 The A-SMGCS display makes it easier to detect potentially problematic situations. 
140 It is easy to learn to work with A-SMGCS. 
141 I would imagine that most operational personnel would learn to use A-SMGCS very quickly. 
142 I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with the A-SMGCS. 
143 There was enough training on the display, its rules and its mechanisms.  
144 There was enough training on how to control traffic with the use of the A-SMGCS.  
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5.2.2 Surveillance 
Id. Questionnaire Item ORD TRD 
1 When visual reference is not possible, the displayed position of the 
aircraft in the runway sensitive area is accurate enough to exercise 
control in a safe and efficient way. 
OP_Perf-05 
OP_Serv-11 
Tech_Surv_26 
 
2 When visual reference is not possible, the displayed position of 
vehicles in the runway sensitive area is accurate enough to exercise 
control in a safe and efficient way. 
OP_Perf-05 
OP_Serv-11 
Tech_Surv_26 
 
3 When visual reference is not possible, the displayed position of the 
aircraft on the taxi ways is accurate enough to exercise control in a 
safe and efficient way. 
OP_Perf-05 
OP_Serv-11 
Tech_Surv_26 
 
4 When visual reference is not possible, a missing label is not a 
problem to exercise control in a safe and efficient way. 
OP_Serv-04 
OP_Perf-12 
Tech_Gen_28 
Tech_Surv_03
5 When visual reference is not possible, a missing position report is 
not a problem to exercise control in a safe and efficient way. 
OP_Serv-11 
OP_Serv-04 
OP_Perf-12 
Tech_Gen_28 
Tech_Surv_03
6 When visual reference is not possible, a wrong label is not a 
problem to exercise control in a safe and efficient way. 
OP_Serv-04 Tech_Surv_03
7 Very frequently I experienced track swapping. OP_Perf-12 Tech_Gen_28 
8 When visual reference is not possible, track swapping prevents me 
to exercise control in a safe and efficient way. 
OP_Perf-11 
OP_Perf-13 
Tech_Gen_31 
Tech_Gen_35 
Tech_Gen_36 
15 I think manual labelling is useful. HMI_REQ 
3.1.1 #6 + #19 
Tech_HMI_07
16 I think that the A-SMGCS surveillance display could be used to 
determine that an aircraft has vacated the runway. 
OP_Serv-09 
OP_Serv-11 
Tech_Supp_03
 
17 I think that the A-SMGCS surveillance display could be used to 
determine that an aircraft has crossed a holding position. 
OP_Serv-09 
OP_Serv-11 
Tech_Supp_03
 
35 I think that the A-SMGCS surveillance display could be used to 
determine that an aircraft is on stand or has left the stand. 
OP_Perf-05 
OP_Serv-11 
Tech_Surv_26 
 
89 I think there is too much inconsistency between A-SMGCS and real 
traffic. 
OP_Serv-03 Tech_Surv_34
111 The A-SMGCS display gives me sufficient information about 
airborne traffic in the vicinity of the airport. 
OP_Perf-07 
OP_Serv-13 
Tech_Surv_32 
Tech_Surv_20
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5.2.3 Control 
Id. Questionnaire Item ORD TRD 
25 A-SMGCS helps to issue traffic information. OP_Serv-30 
OP_Serv-21 
Tech_Surv_05 
Tech_Gen_02 
26 A-SMGCS makes it easier to detect pilot errors. OP_Serv-30 
OP_Serv-21 
Tech_Surv_05 
 
27 When visual reference is not possible A-SMGCS facilitates to give 
traffic information to pilots so that they can avoid other traffic. 
OP_Perf-15 
 
Tech_Surv_26 
Tech_Gen_02 
40 A-SMGCS display gives me better means to expedite or slow 
down an aircraft’s taxi speed. 
OP_Perf-16 Tech_Surv_28 
64 Information alerts are often popping up too late to solve the 
situation before an alarm comes up. 
OP_Perf-18 
 
Tech_Cont_13 
 
65 Too many unnecessary information alerts were popping up. OP_Serv-27 Tech_Cont_08 
Tech_HMI_15 
66 I think that all Runway Incursion Alerts are triggered at the right 
moment. 
OP_Perf-18 Tech_Cont_13 
67 I think that Runway Incursion monitoring an alert function helps 
me to react in an expeditious and safe manner. 
OP_Perf-18 
OP_Perf-16 
Tech_Cont_13 
Tech_Cont_03 
68 I experienced too many false alerts to work in a safe and efficient 
way. 
OP_Perf-20 
OP_Perf-21 
Tech_Cont_12 
 
69 There were cases where an alarm was missing. OP_Serv-22 Tech_Cont_02 
 
77 Issuing clearances to aircraft is supported well by the A-SMGCS. OP_Serv-14  Tech_Gen_02  
79 The information displayed in the A-SMGCS is helpful for avoiding 
conflicts. 
OP_Serv-21 
OP_Serv-30 
Tech_Surv_05 
123 The A-SMGCS enables me to provide the pilots a better level of 
service. 
OP_Serv-14  Tech_Gen_02  
 
Operational Alert Performance 
This operational feasibility tests is a long term trial lasting over four weeks. At this whole time 
operational controllers compare actual conflict situation with the system conflict alerts monitoring 
function. The possible stages of alert performance (see below) are questioned to the operational 
controller. Each conflict situation/system alert is recorded with a time stamp both by the controllers 
and by the system. Afterwards, this will allow the system engineers a detail investigation of deviations 
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between the controller’s expectation and the system alerts in order to further tune the operational 
performance to the user’s needs if necessary. 
 
In addition to this long term test case studies with two test aircraft will be carried out. These two test 
aircraft will evoke runway intersection conflict, which are not covered in the long term trials so far. 
EMMA controller will control the traffic and estimate the system conflict alerts by the same criteria as 
with the long term trials (see below). 
 
too early    
right    
St
ag
e 
1 
al
er
t 
too late    
too early    
right    
St
ag
e 
2 
al
er
t 
too late    
False Alerts    
Unwanted Alerts    
Missed Alerts    
 
5.2.4 HMI 
Id. Questionnaire Item D136_HMI 
75 The A-SMGCS provides the right information at the right time.  
81 Improvements in the A-SMGCS display would be desirable.  
83 The display enables to recognise a degrading accuracy of 
surveillance. 
 
84 The display layout is easy to customise to my own preferences.  REQ 3.1.1 #2 + #18 
88 I think the A-SMGCS is easy to use.  
90 I find the A-SMGCS very difficult to use.   
91 The use of the different windows on the A-SMGCS display is clear 
to me. 
 
92 Too much interaction with the A-SMGCS is needed.  
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93 The A-SMGCS display is easy to understand.  
94 The A-SMGCS display provides an active, involved role for me.  
96 Information is conveniently arranged in the A-SMGCS display.   
97 The amount of information in the A-SMGCS display is not too 
large. 
 
98 Symbols can easily be read under different angles of view in the A-
SMGCS display. 
 
99 Labels, signs, and symbols in the A-SMGCS display are easy to 
interpret. 
REQ 3.1.1 #15 + #16 + #17 
REQ 3.2.4 
# 4 
100 The height and width of characters in the A-SMGCS display is 
sufficient. 
 
101 The A-SMGCS display layout in general should not be changed.  
102 The A-SMGCS display size is appropriate for daily work.  
103 All text in the display is easy to read.  
104 There is too much information in the A-SMGCS display which is 
not needed. 
 
105 Some relevant information is frequently missing in the A-SMGCS 
display. 
 
106 The display colours chosen in the A-SMGCS display are 
appropriate. 
REQ 3.1.1 
#13 
107 Pop-up windows appear at the expected place and size.  
108 The windows on the A-SMGCS display are conveniently arranged.  
109 Aircraft that should have been visible are sometimes obscured by 
pop-up windows. 
REQ 3.1.1 #14 
110 The contrast between the windows and their background is 
sufficient. 
 
130 The A-SMGCS display is detracting too much attention.  
131 The A-SMGCS display helps to have a better understanding of the 
situation. 
REQ 3.1.1 #9 + #15 
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132 Important events on the A-SMGCS were difficult to recognise. REQ 3.1.1 #13 + #14 + #17 + 
#23 + #27 
133 Sometimes information is display, which I don't need. REQ 3.1.1 #12 + #14 + #15  
134 Different colour codes on the A-SMGCS display are easy to 
interpret. 
(REQ 3.1.1 #13) 
 
5.2.5 Procedures 
Id Procedure ORD 
section 
18 Contingency A-SMGCS surveillance identification procedures 
I think when the SMR completely fails but MLAT remains the A-SMGCS display 
cannot be used as a primary means for identification anymore. 
4.2.2 
19 When the direct recognition of aircraft/vehicle IDs through the label is no longer 
possible, due to a ground MLAT failure, the surveillance display should be 
downgraded to a lower level of surveillance, such as SMGCS surveillance display (e.g. 
labelled SMR) or SMR display only. 
4.2.2 
20 I think an individual aircraft’s failure to comply with A-SMGCS procedures (e.g. 
MODE-S transponder failure) requires to return completely to SMGCS procedures for 
all aircraft. 
4.2.2 
21 I think procedures in case of A-SMGCS failure are defined clear enough. 4.2.2 
22 Transponder Operating Procedures 
I experienced that aircraft have failed to comply with the transponder operating 
procedures. 
5. 
23 I think it is appropriate that pilots switch on the transponder before requesting 
pushback (or taxiing or whatever is earlier). 
5.2.2 
24 I experienced that pilots have failed to turn the transponder on just prior to requesting 
push back (or taxiing or whatever is earlier). 
5.2.2 
30 Start-Up clearance delivery 
The A-SMGCS surveillance display enables me to establish a more efficient start-up 
sequence in visibility 1 conditions. 
8.1.2 
 
31 The A-SMGCS surveillance display enables me to establish a more efficient start-up 
sequence in visibility 2 conditions. 
8.1.2 
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32 The A-SMGCS surveillance display enables me to establish a more efficient start-up 
sequence in visibility 3 conditions. 
8.1.2 
 
33 Push-back clearances 
When gates are not visible push-back clearances based on A-SMGCS traffic 
information can be given in a safe way.  
8.1.3.2 
34 I think that traffic information on the A-SMGCS surveillance display helps me to 
decide whether a push-back clearance should be delayed.  
8.1.3 
36 Taxi clearances 
I can rely on A-SMGCS when giving taxi clearances even when visual reference is not 
possible. 
8.1.4.2 
37 Longitudinal spacing on taxiways is easier to survey with A-SMGCS even when visual 
reference is not possible. 
Not part of 
ORD 
38 When visual reference is not possible I think longitudinal spacing on taxiways can be 
reduced with A-SMGCS. 
Not part of 
ORD 
44 Taxiing on the runway 
ICAO doc 4444 states that for the purpose of expediting air traffic, aircraft may be 
permitted to taxi on the runway-in-use. I think the use of A-SMGCS could allow this 
even when visual reference is not possible. 
8.1.7.2 
48 Line-up procedures 
When an intersection is not visible line up from this intersection could be applied in a 
safe way when using A-SMGCS. 
8.1.8.2.2 
49 I think it could practicable to make multiple line ups using A-SMGCS when visual 
reference is not possible. 
8.1.8.3.1.2 
54 Take-off clearance 
I think that the A-SMGCS surveillance display could be used to determine when to 
issue a take-off clearance. 
8.1.9 
55 Landing clearances 
When visual reference is not possible I think the A-SMGCS surveillance display can 
be used to determine if the runway is cleared to issue a landing clearance. 
8.1.10.2 
56 Conditional clearances 
Under good visibility conditions I think A-SMGCS surveillance data helps me to give 
conditional clearances in a safe and efficient way. 
8.1.11 
57 When visual reference is not possible, I think A-SMGCS surveillance data helps me to 
give conditional clearances in a safe and efficient way. 
8.1.11 
8.1.11.2 
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60 Visibility Transition 
With A-SMGCS, it would make sense to redefine the visibility limits for the transition 
to low visibility operations. (if yes, please indicate your suggestions) 
6. 
63 A-SMGCS level 2 procedures 
I think A-SMGCS can help me to detect lit stop bar crossings. 
8.2 
70 A-SMGCS level 1 & 2 phraseology 
Existing phraseology can be maintained without change while using A-SMGCS. 
7. 
7.1.3 
71 I have experienced situations where existing phraseology should have been changed 
while using A-SMGCS. 
7.1.3 
Annex I -
12.1. 
 
5.3 Operational Improvements 
5.3.1 Low-level Objectives, Indicators and Measurement Instruments 
The following table provides a synthesis of the measurements that are envisaged to be taken during the 
validation exercises. The table lists the low-level objectives, indicators, and measurement tools 
associated with the validation platform, where these indicators are measured. These indicators are 
chosen to reveal an operational improvement in terms of Safety, Efficiency/Capacity and the Human 
Factors situation of the controllers. The full list is within document D622 [25]. Indicators like 
“acceptance” and “usability” do not reveal an operational improvement but assess the operational 
feasibility of the system. That is why they are not mentioned here but with § 5.2 “Operational 
feasibility”. 
 
High-level 
Objective 
Low-level Objective Indicator Measurement 
Instruments 
Obj./ 
Sub. 
V&V 
Platform 
Reduced number of 
incidents and accidents  
1. Number of incidents 
and accidents 
Observations Obj. RTS Safety 
Faster identification and 
mitigation of safety 
hazards 
2. Time for hazard 
detection, identification, 
and resolution 
Hazard mitigation 
strategies 
Observations  
 
Obj. RTS 
 Increased safety judged 
by the controllers 
3. Subjective Safety 
Assessment 
Questionnaires 
Interviews 
Subj. On-site 
Higher maximum 
number of aircraft 
handled 
1. Number of aircraft 
handled 
Recordings Obj. RTS 
Lower holding time per 
aircraft 
2. Holding Time Recordings  Obj. RTS 
Efficiency/ 
Capacity 
Lower time between 
push-back/taxiing time 
and take-off time per 
aircraft 
3. Taxi Time Recordings  Obj. RTS 
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High-level 
Objective 
Low-level Objective Indicator Measurement 
Instruments 
Obj./ 
Sub. 
V&V 
Platform 
Lower number and 
duration of radio 
communications 
4. Number and duration 
of radio 
communications 
Recordings Obj. RTS 
Lower number of 
requests to the pilot to 
report her/his position 
 
5. Number of requests to 
the pilot to report her/his 
position 
 
Observations Obj. RTS 
Increased 
efficiency/capacity 
judged by the controllers 
6. Subjective 
Efficiency/Capacity 
Assessment 
Questionnaires 
Interviews 
Subj. On-site 
Higher Situation 
Awareness 
1. Situational 
Awareness 
SASHA_Q 
SASHA_ on-Line 
Sub. RTS 
Higher Situation 
Awareness 
2. Situational 
Awareness 
Questionnaires Sub On-site 
Convenient level of 
workload 
3. Workload I.S.A  Sub. RTS 
Convenient level of 
workload 
4. Workload Questionnaires Sub On-site 
Human 
Factors 
Less Human Errors 5. Human Error Questionnaire Sub. On-site 
Table 5-2: Low-level Objectives, Indicators and Measurement Instruments 
 
5.3.2 Questionnaire Items 
Following questionnaire items will be given to the controllers during the on-site trials with respect to 
the low level objectives mentioned above: 
 
5.3.2.1 Safety 
Id. Questionnaire Item 
28 When procedures for LVO are put into action, A-SMGCS helps me to operate safer. 
50 A-SMGCS is helpful for better monitoring aircraft commencing it’s take off roll. 
61 I think A-SMGCS can help me to detect or prevent runway incursions. 
62 I think A-SMGCS can help me to detect or prevent incursions into restricted areas. 
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5.3.2.2 Efficiency/Capacity 
Id. Questionnaire Item 
9 When visual reference is not possible, I think identifying an aircraft or vehicle is more efficient 
when using the surveillance display. 
10 I think, also in good visibility conditions, identifying an aircraft or vehicle is even more efficient 
when using the surveillance display. 
11 Recognition of the aircraft type is more efficient with A-SMGCS. 
29 When procedures for LVO are put into action, A-SMGCS helps me to operate more efficient. 
38 When visual reference is not possible I think longitudinal spacing on taxiways can be reduced with 
A-SMGCS. 
39 Without visual reference but using A-SMGCS, it would no longer be necessary to make records of 
vehicles on the manoeuvring area. 
41 Coordination between involved control positions is more efficient with A-SMGCS. 
42 With A-SMGCS hand over processes between different control positions are more efficient. 
43 The number of position reports will be reduced when using A-SMGCS (e.g. aircraft vacating 
runway-in-use). 
45 In good visibility line up at the runway threshold is easier to control with A-SMGCS.  
46 When the runway threshold is not visible line up is easier to control with A-SMGCS. 
47 In good visibility line up from intersection is easier to control with A-SMGCS. 
51 With A-SMGCS, a clearance for a rolled take-off can be issued more frequently. 
52 In good visibility take-offs from intersection are easier to control with A-SMGCS.  
53 When an intersection is not visible take-offs from the intersection are easier to control with A-
SMGCS. 
58 The transition from normal operations to low visibility operations is easier with A-SMGCS. 
72 The control of aircraft with the A-SMGCS is very efficient. 
74 A-SMGCS reduces waiting times for aircraft at the airport. 
112 With A-SMGCS, it is easier to separate aircraft safely. 
113 With A-SMGCS, it is easier to detect runway incursions. 
114 With A-SMGCS, it is easier to detect incursions into closed taxiways. 
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115 With A-SMGCS, it is easier to detect incursions into protected areas. 
116 With A-SMGCS, it is easier to detect aircraft on the apron. 
121 I think that the A-SMGCS increases traffic throughput at the airport. 
122 The A-SMGCS enables me to handle more traffic when visual reference is not possible. 
124 The A-SMGCS enables me to execute my tasks more efficiently. 
128 There are less frequent unexpected calls of A/C and vehicles with A-SMGCS. 
137 The use of A-SMGCS facilitates information gathering and interpretation. 
 
5.3.2.3 Human Factors 
5.3.2.3.1 Situation Awareness 
Id. Questionnaire Item 
12 The A-SMGCS display gives me a better position situational awareness (where is the traffic).  
13 The A-SMGCS display gives me a better identification situational awareness (who is who). 
125 The A-SMGCS helps me to maintain good situation awareness. 
126 “Maintaining the Picture” is supported well by the A-SMGCS. 
127 I feel that A-SMGCS enables me to predict better the evolution of the traffic (to be ahead of the 
traffic). 
131 The A-SMGCS display helps to have a better understanding of the situation. 
 
5.3.2.3.2 Workload 
Id. Questionnaire Item 
14 I think identifying the traffic using A-SMGCS increases workload. 
59 When procedures for LVO are put into action, A-SMGCS helps me to reduce my workload. 
73 The use of A-SMGCS makes the controller’s job more difficult. 
76 The use of A-SMGCS has a negative effect on job satisfaction. 
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138 The use of A-SMGCS increases mental effort for checking information sources. 
139 The use of A-SMGCS decreases workload for anticipating future traffic situations. 
 
5.3.2.3.3 Human Error 
Id. Questionnaire Item 
118 The introduction of the A-SMGCS decreases the potential of human error. 
119 The introduction of the A-SMGCS is associated with new types of human error. 
136 The A-SMGCS is useful for reducing mental workload. 
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6 Hypotheses 
Low-level objectives or hypotheses specify in which way the high-level objectives are measured. They 
are formulated in such a way that they can be tested statistically.  
6.1 Technical Tests Hypotheses 
Identifier Hypothesis 
VE-1 The A-SMGCS equipment should provide surveillance coverage throughout the Movement 
Area up to a height of at least 200 feet above the Aerodrome surface, and on the approaches to 
each runway out to a distance of 10 NM. 
VE-2 The probability that an actual aircraft, vehicle or object is detected and reported at the output of 
the SDS should be 99.9% at minimum. 
VE-3 The probability that anything other than an actual aircraft, vehicle or object is detected and 
reported at the output of the SDS should not exceed 10E-3 per reported target. 
VE-4 A reference point on aircraft and vehicles is required to enable the A-SMGCS to determine 
their positions. 
VE-5 The reported position accuracy of the surveillance data transmitted from the SDS to clients 
should be 7.5m or better at a confidence level of 95%. 
VE-6 The resolution of the position data in a target report should be better than 1 m. 
VE-7 It should be possible to discriminate closely spaced targets, if they are separated by more than 
the specified performance value.  
NOTE:  1) Only relevant when one of the targets is non-cooperative.  
              2) The value has not been specified 
VE-8 The accuracy of the target speed data transmitted from the SDS to clients should be better than 
5m/s at a confidence level of 95%. 
The accuracy of the direction of movement data transmitted from the SDS to clients should be 
better than 10° at a confidence level of 95%. 
VE-9 The probability that the correct identity of an aircraft, vehicle or object is reported at the output 
of the SDF should be 99.9% at minimum. 
VE-10 The probability that the identity reported at the output of the SDS is not the correct identity of 
the actual aircraft, vehicle or object should not exceed 10E-3 per reported target. 
VE-11 An updated target report should be transmitted from the SDS to the clients at least once per 
second for each target. 
VE-12 The probability of detection of an alert situation should be greater than 99.9% 
VE-13 The probability of false alert should be less than 10E-3 
VE-14 Having received the target report from the surveillance element, the time taken for the Control 
function to detect and report any alert situation should be not more than 0.5 s. 
VE-16 Each target track should be continuously updated with a new position report at the nominal 
update rate of the system throughout the Movement. 
VE-17 The matrix of detection is a table, which is used to assess the distribution of detection losses, 
according to their frequency and duration. It complements the PCT. 
VE-18 The matrix of identification is a table, which is used to assess the distribution of identification 
losses and erroneous identifications, according to their frequency and duration. This metric is 
not related to a performance requirement but has a describing character.  
Table 6-1: Technical Verification Hypotheses 
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6.2 Operational Feasibility Hypotheses 
Each questionnaire item is tested against the null hypothesis that controller answers neither agree nor 
disagree to a questionnaire item. When this null-hypothesis can be rejected with an error probability of 
0.05 it is statistically proven that a questionnaire item is true or not true. With this result the connected 
operational requirement or procedure can easily be verified. 
Following result pattern are conceivable: 
• Technical tests and operational feasibility test verify an operational requirement. 
• An ORD requirement cannot be technically verified due to insufficient system performance 
(output of techn. tests), but the ANS_CR ATCO confirms the operational feasability of it, then 
it can be assumed that the ICAO requirements could be relaxed for A-SMGCS. 
• If the ORD requirements cannot be satisfied due to insufficient system performance, and the 
ANS_CR ATCOs feel that indeed the system has poor operational significance, the Prague A-
SMGCS has to be improved. 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OF-H0 The controllers’ opinion does not agree to the “operational feasibility” aspects of a 
specific item. 
OF-H1 The controllers’ opinion agrees to the “operational feasibility” aspects of a specific 
item. 
 
6.3 Operational Improvement Hypotheses 
For each of the hypotheses listed in this section, H1 refers to the alternative hypothesis, which will be 
accepted if the H0 hypothesis is rejected.  
 
6.3.1 Safety-related Hypotheses 
In order to examine the Safety, subjective and objective measurements will be conducted. The 
following hypotheses will be tested: 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-SAF1-H0 There is no difference in terms of number of incidents between the Baseline and 
the A-SMGCS Level II. 
OI-SAF1-H1 The number of incidents decreases as an effect of introducing the A-SMGCS 
application and the related procedures. 
The expected result is that the number of incidents or potential accident situations, if they occur at all, 
is less with the introduction of the A-SMGCS Level II and related procedures compared with the 
Baseline system. 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-SAF2-H0 There is no difference in terms of time between the start of a conflict and 
resolution of it by the controllers between the Baseline and the A-SMGCS Level 
II. 
OI-SAF2-H1 The time between the start of a conflict and resolution of it by the controllers 
decreases as an effect of introducing the A-SMGCS application and the related 
procedures. 
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The expected result is that the time between the start of a conflict and resolution of it by the controllers 
with the introduction of the A-SMGCS Level II and related procedures is less than with the Baseline 
system. 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-SAF3-H0 The controllers’ opinion does not agree to the “safety” aspects expressed by a 
specific safety item. 
OI-SAF3-H1 The controllers’ opinion agrees to the “safety” aspects expressed by a specific 
safety item. 
 
6.3.2 Efficiency/Capacity Hypotheses 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-EFF1-H0 There is no difference in terms of global taxiing time between the Baseline and 
the A-SMGCS Level II. 
OI-EFF1-H1 The global taxiing time is reduced as an effect of introducing the A-SMGCS 
Level II application and related procedures. 
The expected result is that the global taxiing time will decrease with the introduction of the A-SMGCS 
Level II and related procedures. 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-EFF2-H0 There is no difference in terms of total holding time between the Baseline and the 
A-SMGCS Level II. 
OI-EFF2-H1 The total holding time is reduced as an effect of introducing the A-SMGCS Level 
II application and related procedures. 
The expected result is that the total holding time will decrease with the introduction of the A-SMGCS 
Level II and related procedures. 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-EFF3-H0 There is no difference in terms of number of aircraft handled by a controller 
between the Baseline and the A-SMGCS Level II. 
OI-EFF3-H1 There are more aircraft handled by a controller as an effect of introducing the 
A-SMGCS Level II application and related procedures. 
The expected result is that the number of aircraft handled by a controller will increase with the 
introduction of the A-SMGCS Level II and related procedures. 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-EFF4-H0 There is no difference in terms of duration of radio communications between the 
Baseline and the A-SMGCS Level II. 
OI-EFF4-H1 The total duration of radio communications is reduced as an effect of 
introducing the A-SMGCS Level II application and related procedures. 
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The expected result is that the number of radio communications will decrease with the introduction of 
the A-SMGCS Level II and related procedures. 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-EFF5-H0 There is no difference in terms of the total number of reporting point instructions 
between the Baseline and the A-SMGCS Level II. 
OI-EFF5-H1 The total number of reporting point instructions is reduced as an effect of 
introducing the A-SMGCS Level II application and related procedures. 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-EFF6-H0 The controllers’ opinion does not agree to the “efficiency/capacity” aspects 
expressed by a specific safety item. 
OI-EFF6-H1 The controllers’ opinion agrees to the “efficiency/capacity” aspects expressed by a 
specific safety item. 
 
The expected result is that the total number of reporting point instructions will decrease with the 
introduction of the A-SMGCS Level II and related procedures. 
 
6.3.3 Human Factors Hypotheses 
One of the best indicators to evaluate a new system in terms of human related working conditions is 
the subjective estimation of the ATCOs’ Situational Awareness. This indicator is also very much 
related to the Safety of the system. 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-HF1-H0 The ATCOs’ situational awareness in the Baseline condition is higher or at least 
equal compared to the A-SMGCS Level II test condition. 
OI-HF1-H1 The ATCOs’ situational awareness is improved as an effect of introducing the A-
SMGCS Level II application and the related procedures. 
 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-HF2-H0 The controllers’ opinion does not agree to the “Situation Awareness” aspects expressed 
by a specific safety item. 
OI-HF2-H1 The controllers’ opinion agrees to the “Situation Awareness” aspects expressed by a 
specific safety item. 
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Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-HF3-H0 When workload is on a non-convenient level, the controllers’ workload with the A-
SMGCS Level II test condition is not lower compared to Baseline test condition. 
OI-HF3-H1 When workload is on a non-convenient level in the baseline condition, the workload 
with use of an A-SMGCS would be reduced with the same scenario. 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-HF4-H0 The controllers’ opinion does not agree to the “Workload” aspects expressed by a 
specific safety item. 
OI-HF4-H1 The controllers’ opinion agrees to the “Workload” aspects expressed by a specific 
safety item. 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-HF5-H0 The controllers’ opinion does not agree to the “Human Factors” aspects expressed by a 
specific safety item. 
OI-HF5-H1 The controllers’ opinion agrees to the “Human Factors” aspects expressed by a specific 
safety item. 
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7 Test Environment 
This section contains a description of the validation platform and the environment in which the 
validation activity is conducted.  
 
7.1 EMMA A-SMGCS Test-Bed at Prague-Ruzynĕ Airport 
The surveillance system for the EMMA test bed utilises much of the existing infrastructure at Prague-
Ruzynĕ airport, including the surveillance sensors (SMR, ASR, and MLAT), the Flight Data 
Processing System (FDPS), the Aerodrome Ground Lighting (AGL) system, and local area 
networking. The test-bed set-up is shown in the following figure.  
 
LAN Switch/RouterRANC
SDS RPS
AUX
CWP-1
CWP-1
CWP-2
CWP-2
CWP-3
CWP-3
CWP-4
CWP-4SDS/RPS
KVM Switch
TECAMS
TECAMS
CDD GEC TEC TPC
MLAT
RCMS
VSDFLocal Area Network
of
ANS CR
IP-RS &
Companel
SMR
MLAT/ADS-B
ASR - E2000
MVP (Gap-Filler)
AGL - AMS.2
FDPS/ESUP
TIME - NTP
Companels
& RS-IP
Sensors and
Information Sources
 
Figure 7-1: A-SMGCS Test-Bed Set-up at Prague-Ruzynĕ Airport 
The specific EMMA test-bed components comprise the following items: 
• SMR Extractor (RANC) Unit 
• TECAMS Processing Unit with Display Monitor, Keyboard and Mouse 
• SDS Processing Unit with Data Fusion and RIMCAS function 
• RPS Processing Unit with Auxiliary Mass Storage Unit 
• Keyboard/Video/Mouse (KVM) Switch Unit with Display Monitor, Keyboard and Mouse shared 
by SDS and RPS 
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• Four CWP Processing Units, each with associated Display Monitor, Keyboard Mouse and 
Loudspeaker Unit 
• Four KVM Extender Units 
• One Gap-Filler System, comprising three Solo-Pro MVP Sensors mounted on lighting pylons on 
Apron North, Companels and VSDF Processing Unit with Display Monitor, Keyboard and Mouse 
• MLAT Processing System with Remote Control and Monitoring Subsystem (RCMS) Display 
Monitor, Keyboard Mouse 
 
The CWP Processing Units are mounted into the Controller Working Position consoles in the Old 
Tower directly below the operational tower Visual Control Room (VCR). These can be used for 
Shadow-Mode trials in EMMA2. For Operational trials, the test-bed system can be connected via 
KVM Extenders to the HMI at the controller working positions in the VCR. 
The EMMA test-bed has also equipped forty ANS CR and CSL vehicles with Mode S squitter beacons 
(SQB). 
 
7.1.1 The Experimental System 
All ANS_CR Tower controllers are working with the “commercial” A-SMGCS that is certified and 
used fully operational in all visibility conditions since May 2005. This “commercial” A-SMGCS 
provides surveillance on the whole movement area (id+pos) and crossing stop bar alerts. It is nearly 
identical to the EMMA A-SMGCS except of that the EMMA A-SMGCS uses additionally: 
• a Gap Filler (Camera system to address shadowed SMR spots on the taxiways and the gate 
area) 
• all conflict alert referring the runway and restricted areas (RIMCAS) 
 
Commercial A-SMGCS software contains RIMCAS alerts too but they are switched off and not shown 
to the ATCOs for the moment. These RIMCAS alerts can easily be switched on, but it is not allowed 
to use them but only to monitor them, because they are not officially certified. The commercial 
RIMCAS alerts are identical to the EMMA RIMCAS alerts, except of the runway intersection alerts. 
At the active Controller Working Position (CWP) in the Tower it is possible to switch on the EMMA 
A-SMGCS for test purposes.  
 
The commercial system has the advantage that it is certified and all controllers are allowed to work 
with it fully operational. But surveillance performance is slightly lower compared to the EMMA 
system but only related to the shadowed taxiway segments. Surveillance performance on the runway 
strips is the same, means, the “alerting” performance referring the runways is not different between 
commercial and EMMA A-SMGCS. 
 
RIMCAS (w.r.t. the runway intersection alerts) has been further tuned in during Real Time 
Simulations in Braunschweig DLR Tower Simulator– but updates can only be fed into the EMMA 
system. The update of the commercial RIMCAS would take 1 whole day. At this day the whole 
commercial system would be out of work and could not be used. Further on, the system would have 
been certified again, because it has changed.  
 
7.1.2 The Baseline System 
Since all ANS_CR controller already work with the A-SMGCS there is no current baseline to be used 
as a reference to compare to the current A-SMGCS. Traffic date before A-SMGCS was used have 
been recorded but are not valid anymore, because airport layout and traffic density have been 
drastically changed (new taxiways, traffic increased, winter vs. summer time). 
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7.2 Real-time Tower Simulator at DLR-Braunschweig 
The Real-time Tower Simulator (RTS) at DLR-Braunschweig is an ATC real-time simulation facility 
for human-in-the-loop simulation. It has been configured to accurately simulate the Prague-Ruzynĕ 
Airport control tower environment. 
Basically, the RTS set-up used for the simulation runs consists of a dynamic module that generates 
aircraft movements according to aircraft dynamic models and a visual system that generates and 
displays the synthetic vision. Pseudo-pilots in a separate building control the simulated aircraft and 
communicate with the controllers via a simulated radio transmission line. The Experiment Supervisor 
uses a master station to control the simulation. A variety of editing tools is available for modelling and 
generating scenarios for the preparation of simulations.  
The visual system consists of a six-channel image generator based on a Linux PC cluster and a 300° 
projection system where the images are projected on a spherical screen of seven metres diameter. 
Using 10° overlap and specific image transition hardware, no image boundaries are visible. The 
vertical angle of vision is 48°.  
Using this 300° projection, the complete Prague-Ruzynĕ aerodrome is visible to the ATCOs, thus 
enabling testing of all runway configuration modes and of taxiing traffic on all taxiways and aprons. 
To make the simulations as realistic as possible, the controller working positions are equipped with the 
same hardware and software as the EMMA test-bed at Prague-Ruzynĕ. The test set-up includes 
TECAMS, RPS, SDS (with RIMCAS) and three CWPs. 
7.2.1  The Experimental System 
This section outlines the set up of the experimental system (A-SMGCS Level II test-bed system). It 
identifies all necessary displays and communication means for each controller working position. 
 
 
TPC TEC GEC CDD 
Tower Planning Tower Executive Ground Executive Clearance Delivery 
Not simulated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-2: Experimental System CWP Set-up 
7.2.1.1 Controller Working Positions 
The TPC Working Position consists of: 
• A-SMGCS 21” display with 1600x1200 resolution 
• Keyboard and mouse 
• Microphone and loudspeaker 
• Flight strip printer for arrivals. 
 
The TEC Working Position consists of: 
• A-SMGCS 21” display with 1600x1200 resolution 
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• ASR 20” display with 1600x1200 resolution 
• AMS 20” display with 1600x1200 resolution 
• Keyboards and mice 
• Microphone and loudspeaker 
• Flight strip tray. 
 
The GEC Working Position consists of: 
• A-SMGCS 21” display with 1600x1200 resolution; 
• Keyboard and mouse 
• Microphone and loudspeaker 
• Flight strip printer for arrivals and departures 
• Flight strip tray. 
 
The following figures show the screens at the controller working positions. 
 
 
Figure 7-3: Screenshot of ASR (E2000) Display 
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Figure 7-4: Screenshot of AMS Display 
 
7.2.1.2 Pseudo-Pilot Positions 
The following figure shows the screen at the Pseudo-Pilot Position. 
 
 
Figure 7-5: Screenshot of Pseudo-Pilot Display 
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Each Pseudo-Pilot working position consists of: 
• Pseudo-Pilot 21” display with 1600x1200 resolution 
• Keyboard and mouse 
• Microphone and loudspeaker 
 
7.2.1.3 Simulation Supervisor Position 
The following figure shows the screen at the Simulation Supervisor Position. 
 
 
Figure 7-6: Screenshot of Supervisor Display 
The Simulation Supervisor position consists of: 
• Simulation Supervisor 20” display with 1600x1200 resolution 
• Keyboard and mouse. 
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7.2.2 The Baseline System  
 
TPC TEC GEC CDD 
Tower Planning Tower Executive Ground Executive Clearance Delivery 
Not simulated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-7: Baseline System CWP Set-up 
The controller working positions for the Baseline System are the same as for the Experimental System 
except that the A-SMGCS functionality is degraded to SMR-only presentation, i.e. no target labels and 
no RIMCAS functions. 
7.2.3 The DMAN Testing System  
 
Figure 7-8: DMAN Testing System CWP Set-up 
For initial DMAN testing only the TEC and GEC controller positions are used, without flight strip tray 
and strip printer, due to the fact that the electronic flight strips represent a DMAN integrated feature to 
get feedback about. 
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7.3 Controller Roles 
There are four ATCO positions in Prague-Ruzynĕ environment: 
• Clearance Executive Controller (CEC) 
• Ground Executive Controller (GEC) 
• Tower Executive Controller (TEC) 
• Tower Planning Controller (TPC) 
The CEC is not addressed in the simulation exercises. An outbound operation will begin with the 
Pilot’s “Start-up” request, assuming that the delivery clearance from the CEC has already been 
received. 
 
GEC Tasks:  
• Has responsibility about departing and arriving aircraft (IFR and VFR) 
• Issues push-back (start-up) and taxi clearence for departing aircraft and taxi clearence and stand 
allocation for arriving aircraft 
• Coordinates with Apron control, when there are some problems with stands (normally stands are 
depicted on the monitor of the information system) (not simulated) 
• Decides about position of de-icing (according to slot, type of aircraft, departure sequence and       
handling company) (not simulated) 
• Passes on stands of arriving aircraft to Follow me  (not simulated) 
• Coordinates with TPC towed aircraft (Data about ARR and DEP aircraft are in the form of a paper 
strip) 
• Prevents aircraft from collision on TWYs during LVP and/or VIS 600m or below 
• Prevents aircraft from collision with obstacles and/or vehicles on TWYs during LVP and/or VIS 
600m or below. 
 
TEC Tasks:  
• Issues Landing and Take-off clearances 
• Operates the RWY and TWY lights 
• During the night (from 9 p.m. to 7 a.m. local time) takes over duties of all positions (not 
simulated) 
• Issues clearance to cross or to enter RWY for arriving traffic (especially when RWY 24 is in use 
and aircraft vacate on RWY 13) 
• Declares LVP (Low visibility procedures) according to RVR and cloud base and operates AMS-1 
(monitoring system for LVP) 
• Finishes LVP. 
 
TPC Tasks:  
• Has responsibility and issues clearances for vehicles to enter and move on manoeuvring areas. 
• Coordinates with TEC 
• Has responsibility and issues clearance for towed aircraft (coordinates with GEC) 
• Operates FDP system, i.e. inputs time of departure into system 
• Coordinates with adjacent units (not simulated) 
• Fills in shortened FPL for VFR flights without FPL (inbound flights) and takes over ETA of VFR 
flights from APP 
• Passes on information about inbound VFR flights to Apron control 
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• Continuous listening of Tower frequency and TEC action to be able to start necessary 
coordination 
• Coordinates with APP all flights, which are going to depart from a RWY, which is not declared as 
RWY in use 
• Coordinates with APP all Go arounds 
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8 Scenario Specification 
8.1 Technical Tests Scenarios 
Technical verification of the EMMA Test-Bed System at Prague-Ruzynĕ airport will be carried out in 
two stages using different measurement instruments. 
• Short-Term Testing: performed in SP3 during Site Acceptance Testing (SAT) of the test-bed 
equipment, using the built-in RPS recording tool and visual observations.  
• Long-Term Testing: performed in SP6 by gathering data over a long period of time using the 
MOGADOR Recording and Analysis tool (see D1.2.1, CDG A-SMGCS Data Analysis [12], for a 
description of the tool). 
 
8.1.1 Short-Term Test Scenarios 
8.1.1.1 Coverage Volume (VE-1) 
The CV will be tested by transiting the Movement Area of interest with a test vehicle and recording 
the target report position and identification data. Coverage will also be confirmed by observing the 
HMI. 
In addition, all aircraft and vehicle movements, non-cooperative as well as cooperative, will be 
recorded and observed over a period of one hour with heavy traffic. 
Record the weather conditions at the time of the test. If possible, repeat the test under different 
weather conditions and with different runway(s) in use.  
 
The output should be maps showing blind spots or areas of poor coverage. 
 
8.1.1.2 Probability of Detection (VE-2) 
The test scenario is the same as for CV.  
Use the recorded data to calculate the PD. Discard reports that are: 
• Inaccurate (> 20m) 
• Not timely (1s ± 50%) 
 
The remaining reports are correct reports.  
The expected number of reports is: Time of the last report - Time of the first report + 1 
                                      TRUR  
 
Then, %100.
reportsofnumberExpected
reportscorrectofNumberPD =  
 
 
8.1.1.3 Probability of False Detection (VE-3) 
The test scenario is the same as for CV.  
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Use the recorded data to calculate the PFD. 
Calculate all erroneous reports that do not correspond to known obstacles considering the required 
accuracy. Add the discarded reports from known mobiles that do not meet accuracy and timeliness 
requirements (see PD test for values). Calculate the probability of false detection (PDF) using the 
following equation: 
 
reportsofnumberTotal
reportserroneousofNumberPFD =  
 
8.1.1.4 Reference Point (VE-4) 
A common reference point should be used for aircraft and vehicles. The reference point should be the 
geometric centre of the aircraft or vehicle. This test aims at measuring the bias between target reported 
position and target reference point especially for medium and large aircraft. 
The test scenario is the same as for CV.  
Use the recorded data to observe stationary aircraft on different parts of the airport, with different 
headings with respect to the SMR, and measure the reported position compared with the actual 
position of the centre of the aircraft shown by the SMR video image on the Controller HMI. 
Calculate the bias for each type of aircraft at different angles. 
 
8.1.1.5 Reported Position Accuracy (VE-5) 
Static 
Position a stationary vehicle at an accurately known position on the Movement Area and record the 
reported position data. Record at least 50 updates and calculate the mean value.  
Repeat the test with the following conditions in different areas to obtain a broad sample of data. 
Record the weather conditions at the time of the test. 
Calculate the RPA according to EUROCAE guidelines. RPA is the worst-case value per mobile 
throughout the CV. 
 
Dynamic 
A test vehicle will make a series of manoeuvres as it drives around the Movement Area. These are the 
following manoeuvres: 
• Straight-line acceleration and deceleration on a runway  
• Taxiing at constant speeds 
• Turning corners 
• Deceleration from high speed taxi to stop at a stopbar 
• Acceleration from stationary 
Observe the Controller HMI and estimate the deviation from the observed position. Record the results. 
8.1.1.6 Reported Position Resolution (VE-6) 
The test scenario is the same as for RPA. 
Use the recorded data to verify that the smallest change in reported position is less than the specified 
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value. 
 
8.1.1.7 Reported Position Discrimination (VE-7) 
Position a non-cooperative vehicle or obstacle at a known position. Move another non-cooperative 
vehicle from a distance greater than 100m towards the stationary object. Record the distance at which 
the Surveillance provides only one Target Report. Move the vehicle away from stationary object and 
record the distance at which the Surveillance again provides two reports. Conduct the test at least five 
times. Repeat the test procedure with the following conditions: 
• Non-cooperative with cooperative mobile 
• Different areas of the aerodrome 
The RPD is the worst-case result from all areas per mobile combination. 
 
8.1.1.8 Reported Velocity Accuracy (VE-8) 
A test vehicle will drive at a constant speed on a runway or straight stretch of taxiway for at least 50 
updates enabling the calculation of the speed and heading. The HMI can be configured to show the 
velocity vector and read off speed and heading for each update. Repeat the test for: 
• Different speeds 
• Different areas of the airport. 
Record the weather conditions at the time of the test and repeat for different weather conditions, if 
possible. 
Calculate RVA according to EUROCAE guidelines per area on the airport. RVA is worst-case value 
per mobile and per weather condition for the entire airport. 
 
8.1.1.9 Probability of Identification (VE-9) 
Monitor the coverage volume with a representative level of traffic. Determine the number of 
identifiable targets and record the number of correctly identified targets of at least 1000 reports.  
 
Calculate PID with the following equation: 
 
%100⋅=
getstarleidentifiabfromreportsofnumberTotal
tionidentificacorrectwithreportsgetartofNumberPID  
 
8.1.1.10 Probability of False Identification (VE-10) 
Monitor the coverage volume with a representative level and mix of traffic. Record the number of 
target reports (at least 10,000) and the number of targets with erroneous identification (based on 
alternative identification means like visual or RT). 
Calculate the PFID with the following equation: 
 
reportsgettarofnumberTotal
tionidentificaerroneouswithreportsgettarofNumberPFID =  
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8.1.1.11 Target Report Update Rate (VE-11) 
In a period with traffic levels approximating the traffic peak, record the target reports for a single 
target for a period of 2 minutes. Repeat this for at least 5 mobiles within the same period.  
Calculate the average TRUR and distribution.  
 
8.1.1.12 Probability of Detection of an Alert Situation (VE-12) 
This test is to be conducted during good visibility conditions and during a period of the day with 
medium to heavy traffic. 
Set the RIMCAS tool for low visibility conditions. Observe that, whenever a mobile is within the 
Runway Protected Area and another mobile is on the runway or approaching to land, the correct alert 
is given at the Controller HMI. 
Record whether the RIMCAS tool gives an alert according to rules.  
Calculate de probability of detecting an alert situation (PDAS) according to the following equation: 
 
%100⋅=
situationsalertactualofnumberTotal
reportsalertcorrectofNumberPDAS  
 
8.1.1.13 Probability of False Alert (VE-13) 
Monitor the system over a sufficient time to observe several thousand runway movements (in total 
about 40 hours over 4-5 days). Assess the number of alerts that were judged false or nuisance by 
controllers. 
Calculate probability of false alert (PFA) with the following equation: 
 
movementsaircraftofnumberTotal
alertsfalseofNumberPFA =  
 
8.1.1.14 Alert Response Time (VE-14) 
Set up an alert situation with high traffic levels and record when the situation occurs (t1, time at which 
conflict situation is created by mobile) and when the alert report is given (t2, time stamp of report). 
Repeat the test at least 10 times. 
Calculate alert response time (ART) with the following equation: 
 
∑− −= ni in ttART 1 )12(  
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8.1.2 Long-Term Test Scenarios 
8.1.2.1 Coverage Volume (VE-1) 
Using the MOGADOR tool, collect at least one week of data.  
Repeat the test as necessary to collect sufficient data to analyse the following conditions: 
• Different Cooperative and Non-Cooperative mobiles that operate on the airport (small, medium, 
large aircraft, vehicles) 
• Different weather conditions 
• Different runways in use 
The tool can locate blind spots and output maps with blind spots for the different conditions. 
 
8.1.2.2 Probability of Detection (VE-2) 
Calculate the PD for the same period as for the short-term tests. Compare the MOGADOR result with 
the calculated value to confirm that MOGADOR is correctly calibrated.  
Repeat the test with the following conditions: 
• Different weather conditions 
Use the MOGADOR tool to assess the PD for a longer period (at least one week). 
 
8.1.2.3 Probability of False Detection (VE-3) 
Calculate the PFD for the same period as for the short-term tests. Compare the MOGADOR result 
with the calculated value to confirm that MOGADOR is correctly calibrated. 
Use the MOGADOR tool to assess the PFD for a longer period (at least one week). 
 
8.1.2.4 Probability of Identification (VE-9) 
Calculate the PID for the same period as for the short-term tests. Compare the MOGADOR result with 
the calculated value to confirm that MOGADOR is correctly calibrated. 
 
Use the MOGADOR tool to assess the PID for a longer period (at least one week). 
 
8.1.2.5 Probability of False Identification (VE-10) 
Calculate the PFID for the same period as for the short-term tests. Compare the MOGADOR result 
with the calculated value to confirm that MOGADOR is correctly calibrated. 
Use the MOGADOR tool to assess the PFID for a longer period (at least one week). 
 
8.1.2.6 Probability of Continuous Track (VE-16) 
Use the Mogador tool to determine the PCT. Gaps (i.e. missing position reports) in each target track 
are counted and a table, like the one below, is filled out. The size of a gap corresponds to the number 
of missing target reports for that gap. The column "0" contains the number of target reports with the 
correct update rate (nominally once per second). Only tracks corresponding to a wanted target are 
taken into consideration. Gaps do not include coasted targets.  
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Repeat the test with the following conditions: 
• Different mobiles that operate on tested airport (small, medium, large aircraft, vehicles) 
• Different weather conditions 
• On runway and not on runway 
 
Size of Gap 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10
No. of Occurrences of that 
Gap per Movement 
            
Table 8-1: Track Continuity 
The above table should be produced for each condition. The MOGADOR tool will calculate the value 
of the PCT. 
 
8.1.2.7 Matrix of Detection (VE17) 
The matrix of detection is a table used to assess the distribution of detection losses, according to their 
frequency and duration. It complements the PCT. 
Gaps (i.e. missing position reports) are counted for every valid track. Then, the duration of each gap is 
measured. These values are transformed to the occurrence percentage per flight, which must be filled 
in the table as shown below. The table is arranged so that the least interrupted tracks are displayed 
near the upper-left corner, and the most interrupted are displayed near the lower-right corner. 
Repeat the test with the following conditions: 
• Different mobiles that operate on tested airport (small, medium, large aircraft, vehicles) 
• Different weather conditions 
• On runway and not on runway 
 
  Duration of gaps (number of missing reports) 
  1 2 3 4 5 >5 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
Number 
of gaps of 
a valid 
track 
>5       
Table 8-2: Matrix of Detection 
The above table should be produced for each condition. The MOGADOR tool will calculate the value. 
 
8.1.2.8 Matrix of Identification (VE-18) 
The matrix of identification is a table used to assess the distribution of identification losses and 
erroneous identifications, according to their frequency and duration. 
Gaps in correct identification are counted for every valid track. Then, the duration of each gap is 
measured. These values are transformed to the occurrence percentage per flight that must be filled in 
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the table as shown below. There will four types of matrix created, in order to assess: 
• Erroneous callsigns 
• Missing callsigns with valid mode A codes 
• Missing callsigns with erroneous mode A codes 
• Missing callsigns with missing mode A codes 
Repeat the test with the following conditions: 
• Different mobiles that operate on tested airport (small, medium, large aircraft, vehicles) 
• Different weather conditions 
• On runway and not on runway 
 
 
  Duration of Periods (No. of wrongly identified reports) 
  1 2 3 4 5 >5 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
Number 
of 
erroneous 
periods of 
a valid 
track 
>5       
Table 8-3: Matrix of Identification 
The above table should be produced for each condition. The MOGADOR tool will calculate the value. 
 
8.2 Real-Time Simulation Scenarios 
RT-Simulations will focus on the operational feasibility of the monitoring and alert function. RT-
Simulation platform serve as a perfect V&V platform to evoke safety critical events and to tune the 
system alerts to the needs of the ATCOs. In addition to this main goal operational improvements in 
terms of safety, efficiency, and capacity gains shall be proved. Also for this purpose the RTS is a well-
suitable means. 
 
There are two phases of simulation with the same scenario specifications planned, except of a different 
controller sample and alert situations. RTS1 will focus on the measurements of operational 
improvements of the monitoring and alerting service and the tuning of them. Conflict situations are 
provoked by the pseudopilots as described in Table 8-7. This will probably influence the measurement 
of other A-SMGCS related benefits (SA, workload, taxi times, etc.). 
 
For that reason, RTS2 will not provoke conflict situation. However, the monitoring and alerting 
service will again be available and will warn and alert the controllers in case of conflict situations. In 
addition to the normal RTS2 scenario, the availability of the ANS controllers will be used to have 
some initial usability tests with electronic flight strips and departure manager services. 
 
Following cornerstones have to be considered when building up traffic scenarios in RTS that are 
comparable to the real traffic at Prague Airport and secondly to meet the V&V objectives. 
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8.2.1 Traffic Load 
In order to keep the number of test runs manageable, it has been decided not to vary the traffic load as 
an additional independent variable. An average high amount of traffic shall be used throughout all test 
runs. 
 
8.2.2 Traffic Mix 
The traffic mix (IFR vs. VFR) shall present a normal day of operations. Helicopter operations are not 
included in the scenarios. 
 
8.2.3 Outbound/Inbound Peak 
There are neither outbound nor inbound peak scenarios. Scenarios consist of a balanced mixture of 
both with an average high amount of traffic. 
 
8.2.4 Runway Configuration 
The following runway configuration scenarios are applied in the simulation exercises: 
• Scenario A → DEP 24  + ARR 31  
• Scenario B → DEP 06 + ARR 13 
• Scenario C → DEP 24 + ARR 24 
 
Different visibility conditions have to be considered when these runway configurations are applied, 
because the runways are equipped differently to cope with Low Visibility Conditions (LVC). 
 
The following table shows the runway equipage for Instrument Approach at Prague-Ruzynĕ: 
 
RWY 24 RWY 06 RWY 31 RWY 13 
NDB – DME (GPS) NDB – DME (GPS) NDB – DME (GPS)   
  VOR/ DME VOR/ DME 
ILS CAT IIIb  ILS - DME CAT I  ILS CAT I   
Table 8-4: Runway Equipage for LVC 
8.2.5 Wind Condition Scenarios 
Wind is displayed and in accordance to the runway configuration in use. 
• Scenario A (DEP 24 + ARR 31) → 350° / 10 kts 
• Scenario B (DEP 06 + ARR 13) → 130° / 15 kts 
• Scenario C (DEP 24 + ARR 24) → VRB / 2kts 
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8.2.6 Number and Length of Scenarios  
8.2.6.1 1st RTS phase 
There will be two simulation phases conducted within WP6.3, concentrating on the validation of new 
procedures and the new HMI. To achieve this aim the RTS1 traffic scenarios are composed of many 
non-nominal events (system failure, conflict situations) that could distract the evaluation of the whole 
system by comparing their benefits, however, they are needed to validate the new procedures by 
getting feedback from the users.  
Six ANS CR controllers from Prague-Ruzynĕ will be organised in two groups that will perform 18 test 
runs each. The simulation trials go with a 2 x 3 x 3 complete within-subject experimental design. Each 
of the six controllers will have to perform 18 test runs (18 cells in the table below).  
 
 SYS 1 SMGCS (Baseline) 
SYS 2 
A-SMGCS Level II 
VIS 1 TPC TEC GEC TPC TEC GEC 
VIS 2 TPC TEC GEC TPC TEC GEC 
VIS 3 TPC TEC GEC TPC TEC GEC 
Table 8-5: Combination of Experimental Variables 
There are three different main scenarios (A, B, C) that are defined by three different runway 
configurations (see above). These configurations should not be varied via the system factor (SYS), 
SMGCS vs. A-SMGCS. However, between these main traffic scenarios, there are additionally 
variations using different aircraft callsigns to aggravate the controllers’ recall effect without affecting 
the traffic scenario itself. That’s why comparable traffic scenarios can be retained on the main 
experimental factor “system version” (SYS).  
The following scenario arrangement has been planned: 
 
 SYS 1 SMGCS (Baseline) 
SYS 2 
A-SMGCS Level II 
A A 
VIS 2 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
B B 
VIS 1 
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
C C 
VIS 3 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
Table 8-6: Correlation of Visibility Conditions and Traffic Scenarios 
Since the controller role is also varied between the controllers (TPC, TEC, GEC), each controller 
performs three test runs per cell. Therefore, the scenarios are additionally varied by the different 
callsigns used, e.g. A1, A2 … A6. 
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 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
QFU ↑24 ↓31 ↑06 ↓13 ↑24 ↓24 
APP ILS CAT I VOR/DME ILS CAT II/III 
Weather conditions Day (night?) 
350/10 2km 
 
Day 
130/15 5km 
 
Day 
VRB/2 RVR 400m 
Timing ~ 60’ ~ 60’ ~ 60’ 
Movements ~ 35 ~ 41 ~ 25 
Constraints TWY RR U/S RWY 04/22 U/S 
TWY A, B U/S 
ILS 06 U/S 
ALS 06 U/S 
NIL 
Allowed TFC ↑24 ↓31 (↓24 + ↑31 on 
request) 
↑06 ↓13 (↑13 on request) ↑24 ↓24 
Possible conflicts 
or malfunctions 
↓31 x ↑24 
↓31 x ↓24 
↑31 x ↓24 
↓24 x ↑31 
↑31 x ↑24 
↑31 x ↓31 
↑24 x ↓24 
↑31 x ↑31 
↑24 x ↑24 
Wrong label 
Label lost 
Wrong direction 
Car 
↑06 x ↑06 
↓13 x ↓13 
↓13 x ↑06 
↓13 x ↑06 
↓13 x ↑13 
↓13 x ↑13 
↑06 x ↑06 
↑13 x ↑13 
 
Wrong label 
Label lost 
Wrong direction 
Car 
↓24 x ↓24 
↓24 x ↑24 
↑24 x ↑24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wrong label 
Label lost 
Wrong direction 
Car 
Conflicts or 
malfunctions of 
interest 
↓31 x ↑24 
↓31 x ↓24 
↓24 x ↑31 
↑31 x ↑24 
Wrong direction 
Car 
↑06 x ↑06 
↓13 x ↓13 
↓13 x ↑06 
↓13 x ↑06 
↓13 x ↑13 
Car 
↓24 x ↓24 
↓24 x ↑24 
↑24 x ↑24 
Wrong label 
Label lost 
Car 
Symbol convention: 
↓  Conflicting aircraft during approach, landing or landing roll 
↓ Conflicting aircraft after landing during taxiing (e.g. RWY crossing) 
↑ Conflicting aircraft during take-off run, take-off or initial climb out 
↑ Conflicting aircraft before take-off during taxiing (e.g. holding point for same or crossing 
RWY crossed etc.) 
↓24 Conflicting aircraft for RWY 24 
x Versus (e.g. ↓24 x ↑24) 
 
Table 8-7: Scenario Description Overview 
 
8.2.6.2 2nd RTS phase 
The 2nd RTS phase is planned to cover the following three different areas with dedicated simulation 
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scenarios: 
o Alert Tuning (outside the test runs – done with separate controllers) 
o Full scenarios (like in the 1st RTS phase) 
o DMAN and EFS test (are separated from the regular RTS experimental scenarios) 
 
The test scenarios for the DMAN testing were divided up into a small demonstration scenario and a 
larger one (see Table 8-8). The small scenario focuses on giving the controllers a first possibility to get 
an impression of the DMAN’s HMI and usage philosophy in the context of the individual integrated 
simulation environment. Two or three of these small scenario test runs (about 20 min. each) are 
planned before a large scenario test run is performed, which aims on resulting in a first user feedback 
under daily traffic conditions. 
 
Scenario Description Number of Arrivals Number of Departures
DMAN Testing small scenario: Scenario to 
introduce the DMAN to the controllers, for 
explanation and first interactive purposes 
4 (RWY31) 4 (RWY24) 
DMAN Testing large scenario: Scenario for 
first usability feedback referring 
representative traffic amount 
21 (RWY31/RWY24) 26 (RWY31/RWY24) 
Table 8-8: Overview DMAN Testing Scenarios 
 
8.2.7 Non-nominal Events 
The following non-nominal surveillance-related events and conflict situations should occur during 
each simulation test run: 
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Non-nominal Description TPC 
TEC 
GEC 
Surveillance: 1   
Label lost C Arrived aircraft loses its label while taxiing on the taxiway. 
As MLAT is running correctly, the pilot must have switched off the 
transponder too soon. 
GEC shall request him/her to check the transponder: "Check if the 
transponder is operating". 
GEC 
Wrong label C 
 
Occurs when the pilot has set the wrong squawk. 
Pilot asking for taxi clearance on a remote stand has a wrong label. 
GEC has to request the pilot to correct the transponder code. The 
phraseology for such situations could be: "Wrong callsign on your label, 
check transponder". 
GEC 
Label swapping C Label swapping should not occur if the MLAT system and the aircraft 
transponders are working correctly. The label is dropped by the system if 
there is no identification update for more than 5 seconds. An aircraft 
should only get the wrong label if it squawks the wrong code. 
GEC 
Aircraft lost and 
requesting 
guidance to the 
gate 
 Aircraft stops on a taxiway and requests guidance to the gate on the  
GEC R/T frequency 
Not simulated 
GEC 
SMR failure  Not simulated due to time limitations within one test run.   
MLAT failure  Not simulated due to time limitations within one test run.  
 
Conflicts:   
A Two simultaneously arrivals on RWY24 and RWY31 (60 sec. to RWY 
crossing areas = T2). 
TEC 
B Two subsequent arrivals on RWY13 with normal separation. 
After landing of the first arriving aircraft, it missed exit P and RWY04/24 
and is still on the runway when the following arrival approaches the THR 
(16 - 30 sec away from THR = T1, 15 sec and less = T2). 
TEC 
B Two subsequent arrivals on RWY13, faster succeeding aircraft is gaining 
on the preceding slower one. Expedite vacation of the RWY (16 - 30 sec 
away from THR = T1, 15 sec and less = T2). 
TEC 
Arrival/Arrival  
 
C Two subsequent arrivals on RWY24 with normal separation.  
After landing of the first arriving aircraft, it missed exit D and is still on 
the runway when the following arrival approaches the THR (31 - 45 sec 
away from THR = T1, 30 sec and less = T2)2. 
TEC 
Arrival/Departure  
 
A A lined up aircraft on RWY24 starts take-off without take-off clearance; 
meanwhile, another aircraft is cleared for landing on RWY31 (16 - 30 sec 
away from THR = T1, 15 sec and less = T2). 
TEC 
                                                     
B ? DEP 06 + ARR 13 
C ? DEP 24 + ARR 24 
2 In LVP (VIS 3) T1 extend to 45sec and T2 extend to 30sec 
1 Letters mark the different runway configurations (see above). 
A ? DEP 24  + ARR 31 
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Non-nominal Description TPC 
TEC 
GEC 
A lined up aircraft on RWY06 starts take-off without take-off clearance 
meanwhile another aircraft is cleared for landing on RWY13 (Speed > 
6kn = T2). 
TEC 
A lined up aircraft on RWY13 starts to take-off when prior landed 
aircraft is still on the runway (Speed > 40kn = T2). 
TEC 
B 
A lined up aircraft on RWY13 starts to take-off slowly, landing traffic is 
gaining (16 - 30 sec away from THR = T1, 15 sec and less = T2). 
TEC 
C Aircraft on RWY24 holding point lines up without line up clearance; 
meanwhile, another aircraft is cleared for landing on RWY24 (31 - 45 sec 
away from THR = T1, 30 sec and less = T2). 
TEC 
A One lined-up aircraft on RWY24, one lined-up aircraft on threshold of 
RWY 31. The aircraft on RWY 24 gets take-off clearance; aircraft starts 
taking-off RWY24. Aircraft on RWY 31 also accelerates along runway 
31 (Speed > 40kt). 
TEC  
 
B One multiply lined-up aircraft on RWY06 from TWY F, other multiply 
lined-up aircraft on RWY06 from TWY D or E. The preceding aircraft 
gets take-off clearance; both aircraft start taking-off (Speed > 40kt). 
TEC 
TPC 
 
Departure/ 
Departure  
 
C No multiple line-up in LVP.  
A Aircraft after landing on RWY24 taxi via TWY D, F instructed to hold 
short of RWY13/31. Aircraft moves closer to the RWY (Speed > 6kn = 
T2) when another aircraft was cleared to land RWY31. 
Aircraft after landing on RWY24 taxi via TWY D, F instructed to hold 
short of RWY13/31. Aircraft moves closer to the RWY (Speed > 6kn = 
T2) when another aircraft was cleared for take-off RWY31. 
 
B Taxiing outbound aircraft cleared for taxiing to RWY06 to hold short of 
RWY 13/31. Arriving aircraft cleared to land on RWY13. Taxiing 
aircraft does not decelerate in front of holding point RWY13/31 or even 
starts crossing RWY 13/31 (16 - 30 sec away from threshold = T1, 15 sec 
and less = T2). 
TEC 
GEC 
Arrival/Crossing  
C No crossing traffic with this scenario. TEC 
GEC 
A Aircraft taxiing on TWY P cleared to line up RWY31. Aircraft lines up 
in wrong direction (RWY13). After take-off clearance for RWY31 (when 
not recognised earlier by TEC), aircraft starts taking-off on RWY13 (T2 
when starts moving) 
TEC 
B No wrong take-off direction with this scenario TEC 
Wrong take off 
direction (optional) 
C No wrong take-off direction with this scenario TEC 
A Aircraft enters closed TWY RR (T2 when penetrates restricted area) GEC 
B Aircraft enters closed RWY 04/22 (T2 when penetrates restricted area) 
Car enters closed TWY A (T2 when penetrates restricted area) 
 
Violation of 
protected areas 
C No violation of protected areas with this scenario  
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Non-nominal Description TPC 
TEC 
GEC 
Taxi conflict A Not a subject of simulations GEC 
TPC 
 B Not a subject of simulations  
 C Not a subject of simulations  
Table 8-9: Non-nominal Events 
8.2.8 Measurements in RTS  
The following sections describe how the indicators outlined in chapter 5 will be assessed. 
Data are collected from two sources: firstly, data is automatically logged during the simulation 
exercises; secondly, data is gathered from the participating ATCOs. The latter category can be further 
broken down into data obtained during the exercise (observational data, subjective ratings), and data 
obtained after the exercise (subjective questionnaires, debriefing interviews).  
8.2.8.1 Safety Measurements 
Dependent variables used as safety measurements are linked to the low-level validation objectives 
• Reduced number of accidents 
• Faster detection and resolution of conflicts (only RTS1) 
As outlined in Paragraph 3.4 of D6.2.2, a distinction is made between hazards being either related or 
not related to A-SMGCS functionality. Both types of hazards will be addressed by the design of non-
nominal events that will be induced during the simulation exercises. These events are outlined in more 
detail in the scenario descriptions in Chapter 8.  
Although A-SMGCS Level II is simulated, so the controller is provided with the RIMCAS function, it 
is not considered at this stage to implement hazards related to failure of this function, e.g. by inducing 
false alerts or alerts not detected by RIMCAS.  
Thus, all three events linked to technical A-SMGCS related hazards that will be used in the real-time 
simulation exercises will solely address the Surveillance function.  
Further, six non-nominal events, addressing conflict situations not related to A-SMGCS, will be 
evoked by various pilot errors induced by pseudo-pilots violating ATC instructions in accordance to a 
prescribed script (see conflict hazards in Chapter 8). The pseudo-pilots will use a stopwatch and will 
note on the Observer Test Sheet the time between: 
• Conflict Start (when the pseudo-pilot initiates the conflict), and 
• Conflict Detection (time when the ATCO reacts on the conflict in order to resolve it). 
 
8.2.8.2 Observer Test Sheet 
The Observer Test Sheet can be found in Annex A. Three observers will perform the observations, one 
for each ATCO position. The right column denotes the ATCO Role that is expected to detect and 
resolve the respective conflict. The observer will also record how the situation is detected and handled 
by the ATCO at the respective ATCO position. This data will be analysed at a descriptive level.  
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8.2.8.3 Debriefing Interviews 
Debriefing interviews will be completed after each exercise. At the end of each day, a further general 
debriefing session will be performed with the whole group of ATCOs who participated in the 
exercises. These interviews will address issues of Safety as well as Human Factors issues. The Post-
Exercise Debriefing Interview can be found in Annex A. This data will be analysed at a descriptive 
level.  
 
8.2.8.4 Efficiency/Capacity Measurements 
The source for Efficiency/Capacity measurements will be the simulation system log-recordings. The 
following dependent variables will be derived as indicators of runway throughput: 
• Number of aircraft simultaneous taxiing 
• Average taxi time 
• Average number and duration of holding times 
• Average number and duration of R/T communications (only RTS 2) 
• Average number of requests to the pilot to report her/his position 
The last indicator “Average number of requests to the pilot to report her/his position” shall be assessed 
by the Observer who monitors the radio communications. 
 
8.2.8.5 Human Factors 
Dependent Human Factors variables will address Situational Awareness, Workload, and ATCO 
Attitude (see section 5.2.3 of D6.2.2).  
• SASHA-Q: This situational awareness questionnaire is one of the two Human Factors tools for 
measuring Situational Awareness (SA) in ATM systems developed by SHAPE (Solutions for 
Human-Automation Partnerships in European ATM) Programme within EUROCONTROL.  
SASHA_Q will be completed post-exercise by the ATCOs. The questionnaire has been 
customised with regard to the set of tool-related questions and can be found in Annex A. It 
consists of twelve questions and is given to the subjects after each test run.  
• SASHA On-Line: SASHA On-Line is the second tool for measuring SA in ATM systems 
developed by the SHAPE programme within EUROCONTROL. A Subject-Matter Expert (SME) 
shall view the outside airport surface as well as the surveillance display. The SME asks a specified 
ATCO a set of SA questions, about one per every five minutes, which results in about twelve 
questions per ATCO per simulation run. The original idea of the SASHA On-Line authors is that 
the SME formulates these questions in real-time as the scenario unfolds. Although this procedure 
ensures that questions most pertinent to the actual situation are asked, this technique requires a 
highly-trained SME. Here, it is proposed that the SME selects questions from a list of appropriate 
pre-formulated questions, which still leaves him/her to decide which of these questions is pertinent 
to be asked and when. The question selected is recorded on the SASHA On-Line query form (see 
Annex A). The SME scores the ATCO’s answer’s operational accuracy as INCORRECT, OK, or 
CORRECT and rates also the time needed as TOO SHORT, OK, or TOO LONG. 
In this simulation, it is aimed that the pseudo-pilots, who are very much in the loop of operations, 
shall ask three questions per test run to the ATCO. The pseudo-pilot decides him/herself when 
he/she asks the ATCO. Answers are gathered on the SASHA On-Line query form. 
• ISA: The Instantaneous Self Assessment (ISA) measurement is a method developed to assess the 
controller’s workload in real time. The controller provides a view of his/her current workload at 
regular intervals throughout the exercise (typically every 2 minutes), by checking a value from 1 
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to 5 on a paper sheet presented by the experimenter. This allows seeing the way in which the 
controller’s workload varies over time. 
• ATCO Attitude Questionnaire: In this questionnaire, 31 statements related to the acceptance and 
the perceived usability of the A-SMGCS DISPLAY will be presented to the controllers. They will 
be asked to indicate in how far they disagree or agree with each statement.  
 
8.3 On-Site Trials Scenarios 
During the 2nd Operational On-site trials “Case Studies” are planned to conduct. Case studies means 
that during the regular traffic (traffic is very low then) CAA test aircraft will fly safety critical 
scenarios to evoke system alerts. The controllers who actively control these aircraft are presented with 
these alert and are asked afterwards for the operational significance. More information on the 
conduction of the operational on-site trials can be found in section 11.2. 
 
There are two CAA aircraft, a BE 400 and a L 410. Following runway intersection conflict scenarios 
are planned. 
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8.3.1 Test 1: Departure from RWY 24 and Departure from RWY 31 
 
Test aircraft : Aircraft  CAA    BE 400               a L 410   
 
 
 
P 
 
 
BE400
from R
When
Then 
File N
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 will get take-off clearance from RWY24 and simultaneously L410 will get take-off clearance 
WY31. This clearance means high speed taxi with speed 40 knots, when alert should appear. 
 alert appears, L410 will get instruction „stop take-off“ and will leave RWY 31 on TWY G. 
L410 will taxi via TWYs F and L to holding point RWY31 and will continue according next test. 
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8.3.2 Test 2: Departure  RWY 31 -  Approach  RWY 24 
 
 
 
 
When BE400 is approx. 30-40 sec. before threshold of  RWY 24, L410 will get take-off  clearance 
te
from RWY 31. This clearance means high speed taxi with speed 40 knots, when alert should appear
When alert appears, L410 will get instruction „stop take-off“ and will leave RWY 31 on TWY G. 
Then L410 will taxi via TWYs F and L to holding point RWY31 and will continue according next 
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8.3.3 Test 3: Departure from RWY 31 -  Crossing RWY 31 via TWY F  
 
 
 
 
 
BE400 is after landing according to the previous test and will taxi via TWY F. When L410 get „cleared 
for take- off“. This clearance means high speed taxi with speed 40 knots, when alert should appear. 
BE400 will cross RWY 31. When alert appears, L410 will get instruction „stop take-off“ and will leave 
RWY 31 on TWY G. L410 will continue to the holding point of RWY 31 and BE 400 to the holding 
point of RWY 24 for the next test. 
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8.3.4 Test 4: Approach on RWY 31 - Approach on RWY 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both aircraft will depart. Be400 will 
join right circuit of RWY 24 and L410 
will join left circuit of RWY 31(black dotted 
line). The both aircraft should be established 
on final track again at distance approx. 10 NM. 
When aircrafts are 45 sec. before threshold, both 
aircraft should be at the same distance in front of threshold. 
When alert appears, L410 will get instruction to turn 
to the left to join again left circuit of RWY 31. The latest 
point for the left turn is the  threshold of RWY 31(red dotted line). L410 will make another circuit o
RWY 31. Be400 will land and taxi via TWYs F and L to the holding point of RWY 31. L410 will 
finish the circuit and will make go around. 
After going around L410 will join right circuit of RWY 24 for the next test. 
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8.3.5 Test 5: Departure  RWY 31 -  Approach  RWY 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L410 is landing on RWY 24. When L410 is 45 sec. before threshold BE400 will get 
„cleared for take-off“. This clearance means high speed taxi with speed 40 knots, when alert should 
appear. When alert appears, the pilot will get instruction “stop take off“. The pilot brakes the roll and 
will leave RWY 31 on TWY G. Then BE400 will continue to the holding point of RWY 24. L410 will 
make go around and will join right circuit of RWY 24 for the next test. 
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8.3.6 Test 6: Approach  RWY 13 - Approach  RWY 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L410 is in the right circuit of RWY 24. BE 400 will depart from RWY 24 and will be vect
final of RWY 13. Both aircraft should be at the distance 5-6 NM in front of threshold and c
final. When alert appears(but not later than 2NM front of threshold of RWY 13), BE400 w
instruction to turn right to join again the right circuit of RWY 24. L410 will land on RWY
afterwards BE 400 on RWY 24. 
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9 Experiment Participants 
9.1 Validation Team Roles 
The following V&V team roles have been identified: 
Experiment Supervisor: defines, organises and conducts the validation tests; ensures that all results 
are recorded. 
System Administrator: ensures correct operation of the A-SMGCS test-bed equipment during the 
tests and that malfunctioning items of equipment are replaced expediently; ensures that the A-SMGCS 
equipment is appropriately configured for each test, which may include degrading some parts or 
simulating meteorological conditions; has in-depth knowledge of computer and network technology 
and is experienced with the A-SMGCS test-bed set-up. 
Technical Support Engineer: responsible for repairing all deficiencies and/or defects identified 
during testing; ensures that all electronic data are recorded. 
Experimental Aircraft Coordinator: ensures availability of aircraft and pilots for the tests, ensures 
coordination between ground and on-board test activities. 
Controllers: users of the controller working positions (CWP); provide subjective feedback. 
Vehicle Driver: drives and positions a vehicle at defined places and speeds on the movement area. 
Test Pilots: drive and position aircraft at defined places and speeds on the movement area. 
Observers: experienced in air traffic control operations, observe and note down the controllers’ 
behaviour in special situations. 
 
9.1.1 Additional Roles for Simulation Exercises 
Simulation Supervisor: responsible for briefing/debriefing of the pseudo-pilots for special behaviour 
during the simulation runs; correct start of the whole simulation system; balancing pseudo-pilot 
workload during the exercises by distributing aircraft responsibility. 
Subject-Matter Expert: (Observer - possibly a Human Factors Engineer or an expert with controller 
experience) organises timing of non-nominal events in the scenarios; observes and questions 
controllers during simulation runs; rates their answers on the form. 
Pseudo-Pilots: have in-depth knowledge of aviation as well as voice communication skills and are 
especially trained for the relevant scenarios of the Prague environment. The four pseudo-pilots 
involved in each simulation exercise run are: 
• PP1 (Arrivals) 
• PP2 (Departures) 
• PP3 (Ground1) 
• PP4 (Ground2). 
 
The pseudo-pilots guide the aircraft according to the instructions they receive from the controllers. 
The pseudo-pilot role mainly consists of two tasks: 
• Building the realistic pilot-side counterpart of the simulation by guiding the aircraft correctly as 
would be done in reality by real pilots 
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• Provoking conflicts by predetermined (by briefing) misbehaviour in order to generate situations 
where the controllers’ as well as the System’s behaviour under critical circumstances can be 
examined. 
 
9.2 Experimental Participants 
9.2.1 Simulation Exercises at DLR-Braunschweig 
Six Senior Controllers from Prague-Ruzynĕ Airport participate in the two RTS study. They are very 
experienced and trained with the A-SMGCS to be tested. 
Two groups, with three controllers each, participate in the two-week long simulation phase, one week 
for each group. The controllers act in the simulation runs as they would act in reality, simulating the 
TEC, TPC, and GEC control positions. 
 
9.2.2 Operational and Shadow-Mode Exercises at Prague 
There are eight EMMA controllers available for the case studies and questionnaire sessions. However, 
during the long term Alerting measurements all ANS_CR ATCOs take part in this trial. Further on, it 
is aimed to interview also non-EMMA controllers. 
In addition there is one Technical Test Co-ordinator from DLR, one observer from DLR, one PAS 
engineer, two ANS_CR Test Supervisors, and four CAA pilots. 
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10 Training Requirements 
The week before starting of the simulation is reserved for pre-experiments. Three active ANS_CR 
controllers, all pseudo-pilots, technicians, and the complete validation test team will test the complete 
simulation exercise. This week is used to tune the simulation system and the used traffic scenarios, and 
to train all involved participants: 
Pseudo-pilots, interacting with the controllers and responsible for initialising of all movements 
(aircraft, vehicles, tows) in the simulation traffic scenarios, are trained three weeks in advanced. The 
training starts with a familiarisation of the overall airport environment (arrival/departure routes, 
taxiways, gates/remote stands, etc.) and the training of standard phraseologies. In a second phase, the 
pre-experiments, those pseudo-pilots are trained in a complete real time simulation scenario using 
typical Prague-Ruzynĕ airport traffic scenarios, procedures, and real ANS CR controllers. Of 
particular interest will be the training of the non-nominal events that are triggered by the pseudo-
pilots. The complete training will take two weeks in total. 
The validation test team, including observers and test coordinators, will also use the week of pre-
experiments, getting trained with the course of typical test runs, test tools (questionnaires, observation 
sheets), briefing and debriefing.  
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11 Conduct of the Study 
11.1 Real-Time Simulation Trials 
It is planned to carry out thirty-six (36) test runs (exercises), each with a planned duration of 
approximately 60 minutes, within the two-week trial period for the 1st RTS phase. 
Eighteen (18) test runs have to be performed each week. There are five working days a week. Half of 
the first day is reserved for training and familiarisation of the ATCOs with the simulation 
environment. In the afternoon, two regular test runs will be performed. The remaining sixteen (16) test 
runs are to be conducting in the following four days, aiming at four test runs per day. 
The order of test runs has been chosen to mitigate recognition and training effects. Mitigation of the 
training effect, when comparing A-SMGCS against SMGCS, has been achieved by balancing the 
IVSYS variable: Each SMGCS run is followed by an A-SMGCS run and vice versa.  
Recognition effects are further reduced by balancing of scenario and controller working positions 
IVROLE interactions, i.e. for each subject (ATCO), no test run is followed by the same main scenario A, 
B, or C on the same CWP (IVROLE: TPC, TEC, GEC). The main scenarios (distinguished by different 
runway configurations) are further adapted by six variations, wherein the callsigns of flights within the 
scenarios are changed. So there are 18 different traffic scenarios in all. 
Each of the six controllers gets a subject number from C1 to C6 to guarantee them anonymity regarding 
their opinions and statements and to facilitate the work of the Test Coordinator to allocate subjects to 
CWP and test runs. 
The following table brings the test runs in a sequence and allocates the factors of the treatment 
variables, the test subjects and the used scenarios, respectively. Furthermore, the last column contains 
a time schedule for the test runs. 
 
No. IVSYS  IVVIS TPC TEC  GEC Traffic 
Scenario 
Planned 
Date 
1 Base Vis2 C1 C2 C3 A1 Day 1 
2 A-SMGCS Vis1 C3 C1 C2 B4 Day 1 
3 Base Vis3 C2 C3 C1 C1 Day 2 
4 A-SMGCS Vis3 C1 C2 C3 C4 Day 2 
5 Base Vis1 C2 C3 C1 B1 Day 2 
6 A-SMGCS Vis2 C3 C1 C2 A4 Day 2 
7 Base Vis3 C3 C1 C2 C2 Day 3 
8 A-SMGCS Vis1 C1 C2 C3 B5 Day 3 
9 Base Vis2 C2 C3 C1 A2 Day 3 
10 A-SMGCS Vis2 C1 C2 C3 A5 Day 3 
11 Base Vis1 C3 C1 C2 B2 Day 4 
12 A-SMGCS Vis3 C2 C3 C1 C5 Day 4 
13 Base Vis2 C3 C1 C2 A3 Day 4 
14 A-SMGCS Vis1 C2 C3 C1 B6 Day 4 
15 Base Vis3 C1 C2 C3 C3 Day 5 
16 A-SMGCS Vis3 C3 C1 C2 C6 Day 5 
17 Base Vis1 C1 C2 C3 B3 Day 5 
18 A-SMGCS Vis2 C2 C3 C1 A6 Day 5 
19 Base Vis3 C4 C5 C6 C1 Day 6 
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20 A-SMGCS Vis1 C6 C4 C5 B4 Day 6 
21 Base Vis2 C5 C6 C4 A1 Day 7 
22 A-SMGCS Vis2 C4 C5 C6 A4 Day 7 
23 Base Vis1 C5 C6 C4 B1 Day 7 
24 A-SMGCS Vis3 C6 C4 C5 C4 Day 7 
25 Base Vis2 C6 C4 C5 A2 Day 8 
26 A-SMGCS Vis1 C4 C5 C6 B5 Day 8 
27 Base Vis3 C5 C6 C4 C2 Day 8 
28 A-SMGCS Vis3 C4 C5 C6 C5 Day 8 
29 Base Vis1 C6 C4 C5 B2 Day 9 
30 A-SMGCS Vis2 C5 C6 C4 A5 Day 9 
31 Base Vis3 C6 C4 C5 C3 Day 9 
32 A-SMGCS Vis1 C5 C6 C4 B6 Day 9 
33 Base Vis2 C4 C5 C6 A3 Day 10 
34 A-SMGCS Vis2 C6 C4 C5 A6 Day 10 
35 Base Vis1 C4 C5 C6 B3 Day 10 
36 A-SMGCS Vis3 C5 C6 C4 C6 Day 10 
Table 11-1: Sequence of Simulator Test Runs (1st RTS) 
 
No. IVSYS  IVVIS TPC TEC  GEC Traffic 
Scenario 
Planned 
Date 
Alert Tuning Day 1 
Alert Tuning Day 2 
1 A-SMGCS Vis2 C1 C2 C3 A4 Day 3 
2 Base Vis1 C2 C3 C1 B3 Day 3 
3 A-SMGCS Vis3 C3 C1 C2 C4 Day 3 
4 Base Vis2 C3 C1 C2 A1 Day 4 
5 A-SMGCS Vis1 C1 C2 C3 B4 Day 4 
6 Base Vis3 C2 C3 C1 C3 Day 4 
DMAN Testing in RTS Day 5 
7 A-SMGCS Vis2 C4 C5 C6 A4 Day 6 
8 Base Vis1 C5 C6 C4 B3 Day 6 
9 A-SMGCS Vis3 C6 C4 C5 C4 Day 6 
10 Base Vis2 C6 C4 C5 A1 Day 7 
11 A-SMGCS Vis1 C4 C5 C6 B4 Day 7 
12 Base Vis3 C5 C6 C4 C3 Day 7 
DMAN Testing in RTS Day 8 
Table 11-2: Sequence of Simulator Test Runs (2nd RTS) 
 
A full scenario test run can be broken up into three phases: 
[0’- 5’]  Warm-up: transitory phase used to launch the traffic, provide necessary instructions to 
participants, explain conditions (traffic load, meteorological, etc.) and prepare the transfer 
to exercise phase. 
[5’- 60’]  Exercise phase: Importance will be stressed on following scripts that correspond to agreed 
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scenarios by creating conditions that enable planned events to occur. For such indications 
about events’ timing are elicited as an ideal roadmap. Even if favourable conditions for 
creating special events are carefully planned, real-time interaction between actors 
(especially ATCO behaviour) may result in scenarios unplanned deviations. If such 
deviations occur, they have to be reported in the Observer Test Sheet and have to be 
analysed and interpreted how they may have influenced validation results. 
[60’- 75’]  Exercise phase: 
Break 
 
 
Figure 11-1 shows the time schedule for the real-time simulations. 
 
Figure 11-1: Time Schedule for the Real-Time Simulations 
11.2 On-Site Trials 
The 1st On-site trials will be mainly used to assess the operational feasibility of the A-SMGCS and to 
give early feedback to the engineers when performance or operational requirements have not been 
met. 10 ANS_CR ATCOs will be interviewed by giving them questionnaires which address statements 
to the operational performance of the systems. Controllers answers to each questionnaire item 
feedback to an operational requirement or a new procedure used. 
 
Further on, the controllers will be asked to give their personal opinion whether the A-SMGCS 
contributes to operational improvements in terms of Safety, Efficiency, and capacity gains. 
 
The 2nd On-site trials will be performed in January 2006 with the following topics: 
1. Long Term Operational Alerting Performance Assessment (Operational Feasibility) 
2. Case Studies involving two CAA test aircraft to test conflicts for crossing runways  (Op. 
Feasibility) 
3. Debriefing (questionnaires and interviews with EMMA controllers) (Op. Improvements) 
4. DMAN Operational feasibility Study 
 
11.2.1 Long Term Alerting Performance Assessment 
It is an operational feasibility test. Controller reports are used to assess the operational performance of 
the alert function. It is a long term trial lasting four weeks from 2nd through 29th of January. At this 
whole time the alert function will be switched on at the active TEC position. TEC controllers only 
monitor the system alerts because they are not certified yet and thus are not allowed to be used 
operationally. At this time the TEC controller are asked for to compare actual conflict situation with 
the system alerts. With each conflict situation they should judge following: 
 
Date UTC  Stage 1 alert  Stage 2 alert  false  unwanted  missed
   early right late  early right late       
                
 
Whereas following instruction has been given: 
Instructions to the ATCO: 
The objective of this sheet of paper is to assess the performance of the A-SMGCS alerting 
function and to adapt it to your needs. For this purpose we need your operational feedback. 
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Therefore it is very important that you monitor all alerts on your A-SMGCS display the whole 
time you are working with it.  
 
There are two stages of alerts. The stage 1 alert (amber) intends to attract your attention on a 
traffic situation that is potentially dangerous, e.g. two aircraft on the runway, one is lining up 
while another one is just vacating. The stage two alert (red) would require an immediate 
reaction by you to solve an actual conflict situation. 
 
If you see such alerts on your A-SMGCS display you are kindly requested to give your 
personal assessment to it. If the alert is wanted by you, you should assess if the alert was too 
early, right in time, or too late to help you in the best way. 
 
If an alert is raised due to a false surveillance target, please make a cross with false. 
 
If an alert is raised although there is no conflict situation that would need your special 
attention, make a cross with unwanted. 
 
Last, if you are confronted with a real conflict situation but the system did not raise an alert or 
information, make a cross with missed. 
 
Do not forget to note the Date and UTC time. 
 
If you find time we would really appreciated if you write some explanations to the 
experienced conflict situation, e.g. CSA456 landed on RWY24 but missed exit C and was still 
at the runway when following landing CSA3267 was 30 seconds from threshold.  
 
Each conflict situation/system alert is recorded with a time stamp both by the controllers and by the 
system. Afterwards, this will allow the system engineers a detail investigation of deviations between 
the controller’s expectation and the system alerts in order to further tune the operational performance 
to the user’s needs if necessary. If the controllers accept the system alerts they are verified and do not 
have to be tuned anymore. 
 
During these 4 weeks the departure and arrivals conflict alerts for runways intersections will not be 
switched on, because the commercial A-SMGCS can not be uploaded with the new-tuned alert settings 
developed in the 2nd RTS in Braunschweig. Alerts will only focus on: 
• all stop bar crossing alert (already used and will be used operationally) 
• all single runway alerts 
• conflicts with regard to an infringement of a closed runway or a restricted area 
 
11.2.2 Case Studies for crossing runway alerts 
These trials will be performed between 16th and 27th of January. There are 8 Controllers trained with 
the EMMA system (called EMMA controllers, trained in RTS). Runway conflicts would address the 
TEC (Tower Executive Controller) working position. Two CAA Test Aircraft are used for these trials.  
 
Conflict scenarios can be found in detail with section 8.3. 
 
These 6 conflict scenarios can be combined and performed by 6 successive departures and 6 landings 
each and would take 2 hours approximately. This has to be done in low traffic periods, mainly in the 
afternoon, approx. Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday from 1300 – 1500 local time. At this time the TEC 
position will be switched from commercial to EMMA A-SMGCS, providing the tuned intersection 
alerts. The 2 test aircraft (and also the other regular traffic) are controlled by the EMMA Controller at 
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the TEC position. After the test run they are requested to give comments to the usability of the alert 
function. 
 
Meanwhile the test aircraft evoke the runway intersection conflict the active EMMA controller is 
requested to assess the system alert in terms of:  
Stage 1 alert  Stage 2 alert  false  unwanted  missed 
early right late  early right late       
             
 
11.2.3 Debriefings 
Debriefing addresses the EMMA controller. Questionnaires are given to them and interviews are done 
with them at the day when they are planned for EMMA (between 16th and 27th of January), most 
probably the day where they perform the CAA test aircraft case studies. 
 
Questionnaires address the controller to estimate: 
• Operational Feasibility of op. requirements and procedures 
• Operational improvements 
Interviews address 
• Questions to potential future procedures 
• Problems or Situations not covered by the questionnaires 
11.2.4 DMAN operational feasibility Study 
The extent of the DMAN feasibility trials depends on the daily availability of the controllers and their 
willingness to play with the DMAN. It is planned to get as much as possible different opinions of the 
ANS_CR controllers.  
 
File Name: D612_TP-Prague_V1.0.doc Version: 1.0  
 
 EMMA 
Verification and Validation Test Plan for PRAGUE 
Ruzyne Airport 
DLR 
 
Save date: 2006-04-05 Public Page 81 
12 Analysis Methods 
There are three principle phases of data analysis (MAEVA): 
- Data exploration 
- Statistical inference 
- Synthesis 
In more detail, but still fairly simplified, this means that, at first, data will be gathered and plotted 
during the exploration phase in order to have a look at it from a certain point of view or a certain 
objective. Then, statistical inference will be looking at statistical population parameters and will be 
testing the hypotheses made so that assumptions can be made about observed differences.  
Many times, during real-time human-in-the-loop simulations it will be observed that the sample size is 
not sufficient for producing a result with the desired level of precision. The data gathered in the 
synthesis phase should suffice to make important assumptions about the performance and usability of 
this exemplifying system. 
Since the present document was only meant to prepare the simulations as well as the analysis by 
specifying what kind of data will be looked at, it would be a rash decision to explain about data 
evaluation methods at this point. The reason is that, depending on the data obtained, different 
visualisation and evaluation methods, which cannot be foreseen at this moment, could be installed 
later. 
A more detailed description of the analysis methods will be included in D6.3.1 “Prague A-SMGCS 
Verification and Validation results” and D6.7.1 “V&V Analysis Report”. 
 
12.1 Experimental Constraints of Simulation 
It is important to assess experimental constraints for the real-time simulations, in order to consider 
their impact on the evaluation objectives. Three main experimental constraints have been identified in 
the scope of the real time simulations. An overview of these constraints are providing in the following. 
The first constraint is the limited sample size. There will be only six controllers providing six 
measurements in each cell of the test design. This will have a significant impact on the internal 
validity of the results. Small effects that result from systematic variation of the treatment variables are 
hard to detect and to prove. 
Secondly, the DLR-Braunschweig RTS platform used for the real-time simulations replicates as far as 
possible the real environment, but some differences remain. It is important to keep these differences 
between simulated and real environment in mind when the interpretation of results is done. External 
validity, that describes the amount of ability to generalise the present results to the real world, might 
be impaired. 
Thirdly, the real time simulation will not cover all possible cases of operational scenarios. Indeed, the 
Prague-Ruzynĕ simulated airport is representative, but an exhaustive approach cannot be conducted 
on the basis of this environment alone.  
Lastly, due to the dynamic character of the scenario, non-nominal events (e.g. conflict situations) 
cannot be guaranteed to be identical from test run to test run or even cannot be guaranteed to occur at 
all. In the test report, such events have to be mentioned and the test results have to be interpreted 
referring to such deviations. 
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13 Annex A: Questionnaires and Test Sheets 
13.1 Biographical Questionnaire 
Personal information  
 Controller Number:  1? 2? 3? 4? 5? 6? 
 Name Initials:  
   Age:  
 
female 
 
male 
 Native Language:   
Education  
 Current Employer:  
 Trained as:  
 Year of training (Beginning - End):  
 Professional Experience (in years):  
 Licences:  
   
Computer Experience  
 Computer experience since (year):  
 Weekly time spent with computer (in 
hrs):  
 
 
13.2 Observer Test Sheet 
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 Observer Test Sheet Initials of 
Observer 
 
Date:  
 
Controller number 1? 2? 3? 4? 5? 6? 
Start Time  
 
End Time   Test Run   
System Role Visibility Runway configuration 
? Baseline 
? A-SMGCS level 2 
? TPC 
? GEC 
? TEC 
? Vis1 
? Vis2 
? Vis3 
? A → DEP 24  + ARR 31 
? B → DEP 06 + ARR 13 
? C → DEP 24 + ARR 24 
WORKLOAD 10min 20min 30min 40min 50min Comments 
I.S.A. TPC       
I.S.A. TEC       
I.S.A. GEC       
Events: Comments / Observations 
Arrival/Arrival 
(TEC)  
Arrival/Departure 
(TEC)  
Departure/Departure 
(TEC, TPC)  
ARR/vehicles/ 
Crossing (TEC, TPC, 
GEC) 
 
Violation of protected 
area 
(GEC) 
 
Taxi conflict 
(GEC, TPC)  
Label lost 
(GEC)  
Wrong label 
(GEC)  
Protection zone 
intruders (GEC)  
Aircraft lost asking for 
guidance (GEC)  
File Name: D612_TP-Prague_V1.0.doc Version: 1.0  
 
 EMMA 
Verification and Validation Test Plan for PRAGUE 
Ruzyne Airport 
DLR 
 
Save date: 2006-04-05 Public Page 84 
Others (conflicts, 
errors) 
 
 
ATCO error (input 
faults, communication 
errors, etc.) 
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13.3 Pseudo-Pilot Test Sheet  
 
 Pseudo-pilot Test Sheet Initials of 
Pseudo-pilot: 
 
Test run   Role of Pseudo-pilot: ARR?    DEP?    GND?    Vehicles? 
System configuration: Visibility Runway configuration 
? Baseline 
? A-SMGCS level 2 
? Vis1 
? Vis2 
? Vis3 
? A → DEP 24  + ARR 31 
? B → DEP 06 + ARR 13 
? C → DEP 24 + ARR 24 
Conflict situations: Comments 
Arrival/Arrival 
(ARR2) 
Reaction 
time of 
ATCO 
  
Arrival/Departure 
(ARR, DEP) 
Reaction 
time of 
ATCO 
  
Departure/ 
Departure 
(DEP, Vehicles) 
Reaction 
time of 
ATCO 
  
ARR/vehicles/ 
Crossing 
(ARR, Vehicles, 
GND) 
Reaction 
time of 
ATCO 
  
Violation of 
protected area 
(GND) 
Reaction 
time of 
ATCO 
  
Taxi conflict 
(Vehicles, GND) 
Reaction 
time of 
ATCO 
  
Number of reporting point instructions Comments 
 ….  
 
                                                     
2 Marks the Pseudopilot involved in this conflict. 
File Name: D612_TP-Prague_V1.0.doc Version: 1.0  
 
 EMMA 
Verification and Validation Test Plan for PRAGUE 
Ruzyne Airport 
DLR 
 
Save date: 2006-04-05 Public Page 86 
 
13.4 SASHA On-Line Query Sheet  
 
SASHA on-LINE Query N°1  
Query: SASHA: Where is CSA………? 
 
ATCO’s answer  
operational accuracy   Incorrect ?  Correct ? 
 
ATCO’s time  
to answer Too Short ?   OK ?   Too Long ? 
 
 
 
SASHA on-LINE Query N°2  
Query: SASHA: Is CSA……… under your control? 
 
ATCO’s answer  
operational accuracy   Incorrect ?  correct ? 
 
ATCO’s time  
to answer Too Short ?   OK ?   Too Long ? 
 
 
 
SASHA on-LINE Query N°3  
Query: Which flight has to be transferred next? 
 
ATCO’s answer  
operational accuracy   Incorrect ?       Correct ? 
 
ATCO’s time  
to answer Too Short ?   OK ?   Too Long ? 
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13.5 I.S.A. Questionnaire (mid-run) 
 
 
 
 
WORKLOAD 
 
Excessive 
 
High 
 
Comfortable 
 
Relaxed 
 
Under-utilised 
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13.6 SASHA Situation Awareness Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Eurocontrol SASHA Situation Awareness  Questionnaire 
Subject Code  Date  
Test Run  Time  
1.  
Did you have the feeling that you were 
ahead of the traffic, able to predict the 
evolution of the traffic? 
Comments:............................................................................
.............................................................................…..............
..........……………………………………………………………
………………………………………….. 
2. 
Did you have the feeling that you were 
able to plan and organise your work as 
you wanted? 
 
Comments:............................................................................
...............................................................................................
........…………….………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
3. 
Have you been surprised by an aircraft 
(or vehicle) call that you were not 
expecting? 
Comments:............................................................................
...............................................................................................
........………….…………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
4. 
Did you have the feeling of starting to 
focus too much on a single problem 
and/or traffic area under your control? 
 
Comments:............................................................................
...............................................................................................
........……….……………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
5. 
Did you forget to transfer any aircraft? 
 Comments:............................................................................
...............................................................................................
........…….………………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
6. 
Did you have any difficulty finding an 
item of information? 
 
Comments:............................................................................
...............................................................................................
........…….………………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
7.  
Do you think the A-SMGCS / SMR 
Display provided you with useful 
information? 
 
Comments:............................................................................
...............................................................................................
........…….………………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
 Please turn page! 
Never Always
Never Always
Never Always
Never Always
Never Always
Never Always
Never Always
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Eurocontrol SASHA Situation Awareness Questionnaire (cont’d) 
8. 
Were you paying too much attention to 
the A-SMGCS / SMR Display? 
 
Comments:............................................................................
...............................................................................................
........…….………………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
9. 
Did the A-SMGCS / SMR Display help 
you to have a better understanding of 
the situation? 
 
Comments:............................................................................
...............................................................................................
........…….………………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
10.  
Do you think the RWY incursion alert 
function provided you with useful 
information? (only with A-SMGCS test run) 
 
Comments:............................................................................
...............................................................................................
........…….………………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
11. 
Did the RWY incursion alert function 
help you to have a better 
understanding of the situation? (only with 
A-SMGCS test run) 
 
Comments:............................................................................
...............................................................................................
........…….………………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
12. 
How would you rate your overall 
Situation Awareness during this 
exercise? 
  
Comments:............................................................................
...............................................................................................
........…….………………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
Never Always
Never Always
Never Always
Never Always
Poor Very goodQuite good OkQuite poor
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13.7 Post-Exercise Debriefing Interview 
 
 Post-Exercise Debriefing Interview 
 
Initials of 
Interviewers: 
 
Date:   Test Runs performed
What comments do you have regarding the Surveillance Display in general? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
What comments do you have regarding the transponder phraseology? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
What comments do you have regarding the ARR/ARR alerts? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
What comments do you have regarding the ARR/DEP alerts? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
What comments do you have regarding the DEP/DEP alerts? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
What comments do you have regarding the ARR/Crossing alerts? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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What comments do you have regarding the wrong take off directions alerts? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
 
What comments do you have regarding the protection zone alerts? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
What comments do you have regarding the taxi conflict detection? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
 
What comments do you have regarding the A-SMGCS in different visibility conditions? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
Other 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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13.8 System Usability Scale 
  Strongly 
disagree 
   Strongly 
agree 
       
     1. I think that I would like to use 
this system frequently. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
     2. I found the system unnecessarily 
complex. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
     3. I thought the system was easy to 
use. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
     
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I think that I would need the 
support of a technical person to be 
able to use this system. 
 
     
       
     5. I found the various functions in 
this system were well integrated. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
     6. I thought there was too much 
inconsistency in this system. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
     
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I would imagine that most 
people would learn to use this 
system very quickly. 
 
     
       
1 2 3 4 5 8. I found the system very difficult 
to use. 
 
     
       
     9. I felt very confident using the 
system. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
     
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I needed to learn a lot of things 
before I could get going with the 
system. 
 
     
       
If you have any additional 
comments, please add them here: 
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13.9 Acceptance Questionnaire 
In this questionnaire, you will be presented with 31 statements related to your acceptance and the 
perceived usability of the A-SMGCS DISPLAY you just worked with. You will be asked to indicate 
in how far you disagree or agree with each statement. Please draw a cross or a circle within the cell, 
which best represents your opinion. When you have comments to a statement, do not hesitate to write 
it down directly below the scale. Otherwise, there is enough space for open comments at the end of the 
questionnaire. 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
        Strongly 
agree 
 
“I experienced the level of safety by using the A-SMGCS system as very high. 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“EMMA enabled you to handle more traffic” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“EMMA enabled you to provide the pilots a better level of service” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“EMMA enabled you to execute your tasks more efficiently” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“The introduction of EMMA will increase the potential of human error.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“The types of human error associated with EMMA are different than those associated with normal 
work.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“The types of human error associated with EMMA are different than those associated with normal 
work.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
 
        Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly 
agree 
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“The A-SMGCS DISPLAY is easy to handle.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“The A-SMGCS DISPLAY provides an active, involved role for me.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“The A-SMGCS DISPLAY gives me support I miss with the current systems.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“The use of the different windows is clear to me.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“Called windows appear at the expected place and size.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“The layout of the windows on the screen is good, i.e. the windows are conveniently arranged.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“I experienced textual representation as appropriate.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“In general, automated features within the A-SMGCS DISPLAY behave in ways that are consistent 
with my expectations.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“I experienced the mouse and the keyboard for an A-SMGCS DISPLAY input device as well-
suitable.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
        Strongly 
agree 
 
“All information I need to accomplish a ATC instructions is available.” 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“The display colours chosen in the A-SMGCS DISPLAY are satisfying.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“The contrast between the windows and their background is sufficient.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“The layout of the A-SMGCS DISPLAY is good, i.e. the information is conveniently arranged and the 
amount of information in is not to large.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“The different information is easy to find.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“Visual coding techniques help me maintain productive scanning.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“Different colour codes are easy to interpret.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“The used symbols are easy to interpret.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“Symbols can easily be read under different angle of view.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
        Strongly 
agree 
 
“Labels, terms and abbreviations chosen in the A-SMGCS DISPLAY are easy to interpret.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“The height and width of characters are sufficient.” 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“The A-SMGCS DISPLAY provides me with the right information in the right time.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“Sometimes information was displayed, which I did not need.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
“The number of keystrokes (or other control actions) necessary to interact with the system is kept to a 
minimum.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
 “I experienced the level of safety by using the A-SMGCS DISPLAY as high.” 
          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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14.4 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
Acronym Meaning 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast 
AGL Aerodrome Ground Lighting 
AMS Aerodrome Monitoring System 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
ANS CR Air Navigation Services of the Czech Republic 
APP Approach 
ARR Arrival 
ART Alert Response Time 
A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System 
ASR Airport Surveillance Radar 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATCO Air Traffic Controller 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
ATS Air Traffic Services 
AVOL Aerodrome Visibility Operational Level 
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Acronym Meaning 
BETA Benefit Evaluation by Testing an A-SMGCS (a project in the Fifth Framework)  
CEC Clearance Executive Controller 
CFMU Central Flight Management Unit 
CPDLC Controller-Pilot Data Link Communication 
CSL Czech Airports Authority 
CV Coverage Volume 
CWP Controller Working Position 
DEP Departure 
DMAN Departure Management 
DME Distance Measuring Equipment 
EOBT Estimated Off-Block Time 
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival 
ETD Estimated Time of Departure 
ESUP Eurocat Support system 
EUROCAE European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment 
EUROCONTROL European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation 
FDPS Flight Data Processing System 
FL Flight Level 
FPL Flight Plan 
GEC Ground Executive Controller 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HMI Human-Machine Interaction 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation 
ICD Interface Control Document 
IDL Information Display Latency 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
ILS Instrument Landing System 
ISA Instantaneous Self Assessment 
KVM Keyboard, Video, Mouse 
LAN Local Area Network 
LVC Low Visibility Conditions 
LVO Low Visibility Operations 
LVP Low Visibility Procedures 
MAEVA Master ATM European Validation plan 
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Acronym Meaning 
MLAT Multi-Lateration 
MVP Machine Vision Processor 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Agency 
NDB Non-Directional Beacon 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
OSED Operational Service and Environmental Description 
PAS Park Air Systems AS 
PCT Probability of Continuous Track 
PD Probability of Detection 
PDAS Probability of Detection of Alert Situation 
PFA Probability of False Alert 
PFD Probability of False Detection 
PFID Probability of False Identification 
PID Probability of Identification 
QFU Magnetic orientation of runway in use 
RANC Radar Analyser and Compressor 
RIMCAS Runway Incursion and Conflict Alert System 
RP Reference Point 
RPA Reported Position Accuracy 
RPD Reported Position Discrimination 
RPR Reported Position Resolution 
RPS Recording and Playback System 
ROP Runway Occupancy Planning 
RTOI Response Time to Operator Input 
RTS Real-time Tower Simulator 
RVA Reported Velocity Accuracy 
RVR Runway Visual Range 
RWY Runway 
SASHA Situation Awareness for SHAPE 
SDS Surveillance Data Server 
SHAPE Solutions for Human-Automation Partnerships in European ATM 
SMGCS Surface Movement Guidance and Control System 
SMR Surface Movement Radar 
SP Sub-Project 
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Acronym Meaning 
SQB Squitter Beacon 
TDL Target Display Latency 
TEC Tower Executive Controller 
TECAMS Technical Control and Monitoring System 
TFC Traffic 
TLX Task Load Index 
TPC Tower Planning Controller 
TRD Technical Requirements Document 
TRUR Target Report Update Rate 
TWR Tower 
TWY Taxiway 
UTC Coordinated Universal Time 
V&V Verification and Validation 
VCR Visual Control Room 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
VOR Very high frequency Omni-directional Range 
VSDF Video Sensor Data Fusion 
WP Work-Package 
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